Workers walk out from a construction site at the Central Business District of Beijing, China Tuesday, 一月. 20, 2015. China's economic growth slowed to 7.4 比去年同期, the weakest expansion in more than two decades. The numbers released Tuesday, are still miles ahead of growth rates in major industrialized economies, but represent a sharp decline from double digit growth in previous years. That adds to pressure on the country's communist leaders as they try to prevent a sharper slowdown in 2015 while overhauling the economy. (美联社照片/王子安)Workers walk out from a construction site at the Central Business District of Beijing, China Tuesday, 一月. 20, 2015. China's economic growth slowed to 7.4 比去年同期, the weakest expansion in more than two decades. The numbers released Tuesday, are still miles ahead of growth rates in major industrialized economies, but represent a sharp decline from double digit growth in previous years. That adds to pressure on the country's communist leaders as they try to prevent a sharper slowdown in 2015 while overhauling the economy. (美联社照片/王子安)

Chinese entrepreneur Guo Xueming shares his experience partnering with Japanese business investors in China. This is a direct translation of his account posted to his Wechat account 在三月 7. - 大纪元翻译队伍

One day in October 2012, Matsumoto Moria, the Japanese Consul General in Shenyang, invited me to eat with him at the Japanese restaurant inside the Isetan Department Store in Shenyang. He wanted to know my take on the anti-Japanese demonstrations, including the smashing of Japanese cars, that were taking place in various parts of China.

先生. Matsumoto advocated friendship between Japan and China. As a diplomat, he actively helped China attract Japanese investment. I met him at the groundbreaking ceremony of the Modern Architecture Industrial Park in the spring of 2010. 不久, he came to my company to see me.

During our first visit, 先生. Matsumoto wanted to know how I was able to bring two top Japanese companies, Kashima Group and Lixil Group, to China in just a few months. These were Fortune 500 companies and top construction and building materials enterprises. Japanese companies are very conservative, and Kashima, 成立于 1840, is even more conservative, 他说. Our company was registered in October 2009, and we signed contracts with Kashima in December 2009, with the relatively small registered capital of 100 万元 (US$14.5 million).

“Your company was set up only a couple of months ago. How did you introduce them to China?“ 先生. Matsumoto asked.

I summarized the three main points for Mr. Matsumoto.

一: The city of Shenyang has a diameter of 200 千米. This construction area is equivalent to the total building area in Japan.

二: There is a big difference in building material quality between China and Japan, especially in prefabricated construction, where China has zero and Japan tops the world. Japan’s prefabricated construction technology therefore has the advantage in China. It is able to take the market.

三: Although our company was very small, our team members were all entrepreneurs and familiar with the market. Japanese companies that want to invest in China need a partner who understands the market.

My three points are actually just one: 市场, 市场, 市场.

What business cares most about is the market. Japanese companies came to China’s market. We signed contracts with Kashima, which brought Lixil. They also brought 17 affiliated companies to investigate the Chinese market.

然而, during our meal at the Japanese restaurant, 先生. Matsumoto commented that with China’s anti-Japan sentiments, many Japanese companies had reservations about the prospects of investing in China. He asked for my perspective, as a Chinese entrepreneur, on the future trend of Sino-Japanese business cooperation.

I was very optimistic and told him that China’s three decades of development had benefited from the open-door policy. The future wouldn’t diverge from this policy.

此外, consumers are very practical. There was no need to worry that there wouldn’t be a market for good products, I assured him. Nationalist emotional outrage and pragmatism in shopping are not the same thing.

And finally, those who boycott foreign products and smash cars on the streets don’t represent most Chinese people, I told him.

先生. Matsumoto agreed with my analysis. He talked to me about the Japanese government being sincere about Japanese-Chinese friendship and about clearing Japanese companies’ doubts about China. He also talked about a plan to build a Japanese road in the Hunnan district of Shenyang to provide a favorable environment for Japanese businessmen there, and he invited us to invest in the road.

Shortly after my meeting with Mr. Matsumoto, a young man who had smashed a car in Xi’an was sentenced to prison. But Japanese companies remained sensitive, realistic and conservative; it did not help much to create a more optimistic attitude.

几个月后,, the Kashima Group and Lixil Group decided to withdraw from the Chinese market. The plan of 17 related Japanese companies entering China also evaporated.

As their partner, we tried to find viable solutions. I asked twice to hold talks with the high-level executives of the three companies to study the issue of product adaptability in China and solve operational difficulties. But they refused to talk. They did not even listen to solution proposals. They were determined to withdraw and bear the financial and credibility losses. This was clearly not a decision based on cost. They had lost confidence in China’s market discipline. If a business is confident about the market, it will first think about solutions to problems instead of closing down without even listening to any solutions.

Kashima and Lixil left. Although we took over their technology and team and carried on, it was difficult to get expected returns from the tens of millions invested. Our team’s dozens of trips to Japan to negotiate—which we took great pride in—came to nothing. Our dream to build safe, earthquake-resistant residential housing in China based on Japanese architectural norms was difficult to achieve in the short term.

Chinese people are the biggest losers.

I do understand the Japanese firms. Investor confidence is based on predictability. If a country’s market is not determined by the key economic element of scarcity, but instead by uncertain factors, such as political, diplomatic, and nationalistic emotions, it will shake the confidence of foreign capital. Those with capital are not willing to risk it in an environment that offers no security.

The most important foundation of the market economy is the protection of private property. Customers are resources that are part of that property, and they are the only source of return on investment. Encouraging boycotts of products is in essence encouraging infringement and deprivation of property rights. If non-economic factors of resistance are regarded as legitimate and correct, and often happen in a society, it will fundamentally shake the foundation of a market economy.

While China’s anti-Japan protests were brief, companies see what they imply. Just like seeing a maggot in the corner of a room, one’s immediate conclusion is that the room itself is dirty.

最近几年, many foreign-funded enterprises have withdrawn from China. The Isedan, where Mr. Matsumoto invited me for dinner, also went bankrupt. The success rate of introducing foreign investment has substantially declined. 当然, there were many factors. By sharing my own experience, I just want to remind everyone of the harm we inflict when we direct our patriotic sentiments toward foreign companies.

I think politicians and diplomats should garner the wisdom, means, and patience to resolve disputes between countries. They should not motivate the public to smash foreign cars, or boycott foreign supermarkets or foreign fast food chains, which undermines the overall open-door policy and the basis of the market economy.

在这里阅读完整的文章

Chinese sales staff walk along an aisle paved with gold bars at a gold exchange house in Kunming, 中国, 十二月. 11, 2012. (STR / AFP / Getty图像)Chinese sales staff walk along an aisle paved with gold bars at a gold exchange house in Kunming, 中国, 十二月. 11, 2012. (STR / AFP / Getty图像)

The world is full of golden rules. There is one for every field: 伦理, communication, fashion. But there is only one that counts, the golden rule of money: “Who has the gold makes the rules.”

中国, 它似乎, wants to make the rules in the international monetary system, which is why it has been acquiring vast amounts of gold both through private and official channels.

Because of the obscure nature of the Chinese gold market and the reluctance of Chinese officials to show their hand, nobody has been able to accurately calculate how much gold the Chinese have amassed since about 2000, when they began amassing it.

Enter Koos Jansen, an analyst with Singapore bullion dealer Bullion Star. He has studied the Chinese gold market for years and recently came up with an estimate of total Chinese gold holdings: 19,500 metric tons, 要么 21,495 我们. 吨, at the end of January 2017.

“They have promoted gold ownership as a store of value since at least 2002, but more so when they introduced the ‘storing gold with the people’ concept in 2004,” says Jansen, a campaign encouraging private citizens to buy gold.

Private Hoard

According to Jansen’s estimates, total private holdings, including those of individuals and firms, 是 15,500 metric tons. The official reserves of the People’s Bank of China (中国人民银行) are around 4,000 metric tons.

This would make Chinese the second biggest holders of gold after India, where citizens are estimated to hold 20,000 metric tons of gold in jewelry and other forms. Private sector holdings for the United States are unknown, but the Treasury still holds 8,134 tons in official reserves.

But where did China get all this gold when in the year 2000 it only had 4,000 tons in total?

The first piece of the puzzle is domestic mining.

“In the 1970s when China needed foreign exchange, that’s when they started their mining industry. They were supposed to start exploration and the people were incentivized to mine gold. That’s why there are so many gold mines in China.” He pegs the number at around 600.

Those 600 mines produced 490 tons of gold in 2015, making China the biggest producer ahead of Australia with 300 吨.

Importing Into a Black Hole

The next piece of the puzzle are imports. According to Jansen’s estimates, China imported about 1,300 tons of gold in 2016, mostly through Hong Kong but also directly from Switzerland and the United Kingdom.

这里, Jansen points out a peculiarity regarding Asian buying: “Asian demand is strong when the price goes down. Western demand is strong when the price goes up. 在四月份 2013, the gold price collapsed and a lot of gold was exported from the West to China, mostly from the UK.”

When the gold gets into China, it is then sold through the Shanghai Gold Exchange (SGE), which also handles scrap supply and domestic mining.

Curiously, Jansen points out, none of this supply is going to the central bank but rather to consumers and companies.

“In the domestic market, there are laws and incentives to push supplies through the SGE. Scrap, domestic production, 进口, all go through SGE at first. The withdrawals from the exchange are equal to total private gold demand.”

Private demand includes individuals who want to diversify their assets or institutional investors, like pension funds but also the gold sold to jewelry companies for later resale.

“Companies and individuals buy gold for the same reason. Get out of the Renminbi, diversify, 保护, 等等,“ 他说.

As for the central bank, Jansen says that their purchases don’t show up in official import statistics and are kept a tight secret.

“The Chinese army even has a special division, I call it the gold army. This gold army can still be active, they can pick it up directly in the UK,“ 他说. The central bank also uses commercial banks who buy in Switzerland or South Africa and secretly ship the gold to China.

例如, the total gold holdings of the London Bullion Market Association dropped by 2,750 tons from 2011 至 2015 but net exports were only 1,000 吨. 从而, 那些 1,750 tons are unaccounted for and most likely ended up in official Chinese reserves.

According to Jansen’s contacts at Chinese banks, official holdings are closer to 4,000 tons rather than the published figure of 1839 吨.

What does China need that gold for? “They buy official gold to internationalize the Renminbi. If there are enough reserves behind it, they can make it a credible currency.” He who has the gold makes the rules.

That’s also why China doesn’t allow even one ounce of gold and silver to leave its shores once it enters. “The West has been selling gold into a black hole,” says Jansen.

在这里阅读完整的文章

Chinese sales staff walk along an aisle paved with gold bars at a gold exchange house in Kunming, 中国, 十二月. 11, 2012. (STR / AFP / Getty图像)Chinese sales staff walk along an aisle paved with gold bars at a gold exchange house in Kunming, 中国, 十二月. 11, 2012. (STR / AFP / Getty图像)

The world is full of golden rules. There is one for every field: 伦理, communication, fashion. But there is only one that counts, the golden rule of money: “Who has the gold makes the rules.”

中国, 它似乎, wants to make the rules in the international monetary system, which is why it has been acquiring vast amounts of gold both through private and official channels.

Because of the obscure nature of the Chinese gold market and the reluctance of Chinese officials to show their hand, nobody has been able to accurately calculate how much gold the Chinese have amassed since about 2000, when they began amassing it.

Enter Koos Jansen, an analyst with Singapore bullion dealer Bullion Star. He has studied the Chinese gold market for years and recently came up with an estimate of total Chinese gold holdings: 19,500 metric tons, 要么 21,495 我们. 吨, at the end of January 2017.

“They have promoted gold ownership as a store of value since at least 2002, but more so when they introduced the ‘storing gold with the people’ concept in 2004,” says Jansen, a campaign encouraging private citizens to buy gold.

Private Hoard

According to Jansen’s estimates, total private holdings, including those of individuals and firms, 是 15,500 metric tons. The official reserves of the People’s Bank of China (中国人民银行) are around 4,000 metric tons.

This would make Chinese the second biggest holders of gold after India, where citizens are estimated to hold 20,000 metric tons of gold in jewelry and other forms. Private sector holdings for the United States are unknown, but the Treasury still holds 8,134 tons in official reserves.

But where did China get all this gold when in the year 2000 it only had 4,000 tons in total?

The first piece of the puzzle is domestic mining.

“In the 1970s when China needed foreign exchange, that’s when they started their mining industry. They were supposed to start exploration and the people were incentivized to mine gold. That’s why there are so many gold mines in China.” He pegs the number at around 600.

Those 600 mines produced 490 tons of gold in 2015, making China the biggest producer ahead of Australia with 300 吨.

Importing Into a Black Hole

The next piece of the puzzle are imports. According to Jansen’s estimates, China imported about 1,300 tons of gold in 2016, mostly through Hong Kong but also directly from Switzerland and the United Kingdom.

这里, Jansen points out a peculiarity regarding Asian buying: “Asian demand is strong when the price goes down. Western demand is strong when the price goes up. 在四月份 2013, the gold price collapsed and a lot of gold was exported from the West to China, mostly from the U.K.”

When the gold gets into China, it is then sold through the Shanghai Gold Exchange (SGE), which also handles scrap supply and domestic mining.

Curiously, Jansen points out, none of this supply is going to the central bank but rather to consumers and companies.

“In the domestic market, there are laws and incentives to push supplies through the SGE. Scrap, domestic production, 进口, all go through SGE at first. The withdrawals from the exchange are equal to total private gold demand.”

Private demand includes individuals who want to diversify their assets or institutional investors, like pension funds but also the gold sold to jewelry companies for later resale.

“Companies and individuals buy gold for the same reason. Get out of the Renminbi, diversify, 保护, etc.,” he says.

As for the central bank, Jansen says that their purchases don’t show up in official import statistics and are kept a tight secret.

“The Chinese army even has a special division, I call it the gold army. This gold army can still be active, they can pick it up directly in the U.K.,” he says. The central bank also uses commercial banks who buy in Switzerland or South Africa and secretly ship the gold to China.

例如, the total gold holdings of the London Bullion Market Association dropped by 2,750 tons from 2011 至 2015 but net exports were only 1,000 吨. 从而, 那些 1,750 tons are unaccounted for and most likely ended up in official Chinese reserves.

According to Jansen’s contacts at Chinese banks, official holdings are closer to 4,000 tons rather than the published figure of 1839 吨.

What does China need that gold for? “They buy official gold to internationalize the renminbi. If there are enough reserves behind it, they can make it a credible currency.” He who has the gold makes the rules.

That’s also why China doesn’t allow even one ounce of gold and silver to leave its shores once it enters. As Jansen put it: “The West has been selling gold into a black hole.”

在这里阅读完整的文章

戈登·张有点早,他写的书“中国即将崩溃”的 2001.

他预测,中国经济的崩溃和共产党的十年内垮台,他的预测为四年过期.

然而, 他在书中提出的核心论点是比以往更加有效,常继续为我们提供了中国政治经济的未经审查幕后的观点.

大纪元采访了长安有关表面上稳定中国 2017 什么是表面下造成真正的摩擦.

大纪元时报: 中国设法稳定其经济 2016, 将政权能够继续在 2017?

章家敦: 中国看起来强大,但它实际上是弱. 已通过的不归路.

他们付出的债务金额巨大, 他们这样做稳定经济. 制造业是一个受益者; 我们开始看到一些通胀. 但这样做的代价是巨大的. 它是利用债务产生的旧增长策略. 它显示了绝望比什么都重要.

有一些事情,中国应该做的关于改革 2017, 但他们不会得到它,因为政治责任的实现. 今年我们有一个半十年事件, 在今年秋季的党代会, 在那里,他们要么宣布一项新的领袖或溪·金平保持控制. 这是一个关键的一年.

我想他们一定会成功通过党代会拿着线. 之后, 他们会失败.

因此,他们要尝试压阵. 习近平无情地从利·凯基所采取的经济组合. 他得到的信用, 但他也得到了怪. 他不会希望看到现在和党的十七大之间的重大破坏性事件. 这应该是显而易见, 但很多人考虑到这一点.

我想他们一定会成功通过党代会拿着线. 之后, 他们会失败. 他们要防止调整,只要他们有能力这样做. 他们创造就业机会的能力, 保持GDP增长接近 7, 所有的这些东西他们会尝试做.

即使是在不断增长的官方汇率, 中国创造的债务超过5倍GDP增量快. 北京能与鬼魂城市和高速铁路发展经济没有出路,但是这不是免费的, 这是不可持续的.

党的十七大之后, 中国将进入自由落体.

可以改变中国经济的唯一的事情是根本的经济改革. 但他们正在朝着倒退的方式, 北京再次刺激. 它以中国离消费经济, 对国家的, 远离私人公司.

中国是不会有另一个 2008, 这将是中国 1929.

中国梦想要一个强大的国家, 这不是与市场化改革相兼容. 即使僖宗弥补自由化和变化, 这将是太少太迟. 刺激会增加潜在的失衡. 这是怎么回事,使其更难以调整.

大纪元时报: 什么是发生浅表稳定性下方?

先生. 常: 看看去年发生了什么, 资金流出很可能高于 2015. 和 2015 是史无前例的, 介于两者之间 $900 十亿和 $1 万亿美元.

中国人民看看其他人看到,并没有意义了. 他们看到了经济并没有增长. 人们关注着国家的政治方向, 而人们看到的到底是不是太远了, 所以他们把他们的钱.

人们还留下. 中国青年常来美国接受教育; 然后他们回去. 现在中国的孩子得到教育, 他们试图为一家投资银行工作, 他们尽量留. 事情并非像在家里好北京保持.

要停止资本外流,保持稳定, 他们把严厉的资本管制在10月开始, 十一月 2016.

他们把一些真正的限制对企业和跨国公司对外投资. 他们能做到这一点, 但需要多少时间? 他们disincentivizing人把钱投入中国,因为他们不知道自己可以再次把它拿出来. 尽管控制, 他们有记录流出. 下半年资本外流, 当控制开始, 比上半年高.

他们将继续在国会后,事情顺利, 但他们不会有继续比赛的能力. 整个事情是关于信心, 而且是对中国的信心失败.

大纪元时报: 他们还利用其外汇储备来管理货币的跌幅. 国际货币基金组织(IMF) (国际货币基金组织) 例如说, $3 万亿他们有足够的运行经济.

章家敦: 他们可以给你的任何号码, 你不知道它是否是正确的, 就像GDP. 你不能去外汇管理局 (安全) 并期待通过他们的书. 他们可以报告任何, 你不”知道. 他们具有较高的激励伪造该数字.

我们也知道他们有一个综合的空头头寸,因为他们是通过国有银行出售衍生品. 如果你看一下外汇的估计每个月保留, 他们总是胜过调查. 中国始终优于, 它并不需要一个天才弄清楚的是,FX数量不可能是正确的. 误报其外汇储备下降最小化问题, 所以人们继续相信在货币.

他们可以报告任何, 你不”知道. 他们具有较高的激励伪造该数字.

所以,我认为他们没有 $3 兆. 他们做的伎俩巴西拉 2014 销售衍生品,而不是实际的美元. 据我的消息来源, 有 $500 十亿美元仍然被占.

再就是在中国外汇储备非流动性投资, 周围 $1 兆. 根据我的估计, 你再向下 $1.5 万亿可用资金来保卫货币. 的外汇储备是不一样大和液体作为北京希望他们能.

大纪元时报: 因此,他们将不得不贬值迟早.

章家敦: 我不认为他们会在今年晚些时候第19次党代会之前贬值.

然后,他们将要贬值, 但不是远的北部8 [当前速度 6.9 每美元] 因为它需要. 贬值不足会动摇信心; 人们认为这是不够的, 它有更. 终于, 有人要弄清楚他们的储备数字是错的. 但是他们需要捍卫自己的货币有一件事是外币.

溪·金平说,中国梦是一个强大的中国. 于是,他负责一切,永不贬值有利于中国消费者. 他们继续做出愚蠢的决定. 它的政治制度; 政治当务之急是太强大了. 这将是太尴尬做批发的改革. 他想出现强劲. 他们一直试图阻止自然经济的调整,通过这样做,他们已经取得了根本性的失衡更大.

那么到底, 中国是不会有另一个 2008, 这将是中国 1929.

在这里阅读完整的文章

编者按: 下面列约 Cao Dewang (或CHO德王), 在玻璃行业的著名企业家,在中国顶级慈善家. 大约两个月前, 曹透露在美国的投资计划,总计约 $1 十亿, 预计将创造数千个就业机会. 最近的一次采访曹, 在那里,他解释了为什么他作出的决定, 导致中国对国家经济激烈的讨论,并在中国做生意的障碍. 由金融专栏作家道峰下柱之间最流行的话题.

一年前, 中国地产大亨李嘉诚大量卖掉了自己的房地产资产在中国大陆和“越狱”到英国. 当时, 一篇题为, “不要让李嘉诚运行,“网上广为流传. 但也许是因为李的香港公民,而不是作为一个外省人, 官方媒体采取了撤退非常重视忍住. 然而, 一年后, Cao Dewang, 福耀玻璃工业集团董事长, 第二大汽车玻璃制造商在世界上, 离开了美国建厂,计划投资 $1 十亿. 这一次,中国媒体回应哗然.

为什么曹, 玻璃的国王和中国的头号恩人, 去美国? 原因是在中国做生意的成本高. 据曹, 除了工资中国低, 土地, 税收, 能源, 后勤, 和其他成本都在中国比在美国高得多.

随着中国制造业的一个关键人物, 曹的经济评价, 虽然使中国丢脸, 展示了一个真正的企业家的思想. 资本追逐自然回报率最高, 如果这是真的, 曹反对中国的实体经济不佳投票与他的脚. 现在中国媒体要求曹原地不动. 但是,即使曹德旺保持, will Zong Qinghou, 董明珠等企业家这样做?

我们需要认真考虑如何真正把这些中国制造商和支持实体经济的运行中的开发.

修复中国的实体经济

要创建“慢牛市”行情, 中国证券监督管理委员会 (中国证监会) 最近重拳打击“怪物股,“一个术语,指那些不合理的扣球或价格暴跌, 即使在严重的金融市场损失的成本. 显然地, Liu Shiyu, 中国证监会主席, 了解政治非常好. 响应于从顶部调用以从虚拟到实转换经济, 中国证监会已经确定去杠杆化, 挤泡沫, 和防范风险. 看来他们现在认识到,中国的实体经济的复苏,不能再拖延.

最近的中央经济工作会议期间,, 高级别官员定下了基调, 与主要焦点是减少泡沫. 根据这一原理, 股市将经历短期调整和痛苦, 但是这据说充当的基础 2017 缓慢而稳定的牛市. 还预测, 然而, 是一个长期的资本短缺.

为什么没有中国的实体经济赚钱? 由于需求不足. 为什么是不足的需求? 因为人们没钱花. 为什么没有人有钱? 他们的钱被带走的房地产投机和各种金融诈骗. 此外, 多年的政府刺激消费产生资产泡沫, 取得了富人越来越富,穷人越来越穷. M2的增长主要的受益者是高收入群体, 但是他们需要消耗不会增长之多,由于边际效用递减.

由于经济衰退打击了实体经济开始在 2014, 热钱洪水泡发后泡沫膨胀. 在早期的 2014, 债市反弹, 其次是股市在这一年的下半年, 房地产市场 2015, 那么大宗商品市场 2016. 此外, 使用因特网在最近几年已导致在虚拟经济的加速和气泡. 许多企业提出千亿人民币只是告诉通过Powerpoint演示文稿一个好故事.

如果我们要回到实体经济, 我们需要拿出勇气和行动, 否则整个商业界会跑掉.

曹德旺的故事也暴露了中国经济复苏计划的一大痛处: 高税收. 中国拥有世界上多数政府投资项目. 因此,它具有征收最高税以维持自身. 此外, 当地方政府的土地出让收入玩完, 税收压力将变得更高. 马上, 减税听起来好像只是童话故事!

需很长时间, 中国的人均收入增长一直高于全国GDP降低. 国内生产总值增长一直低于税收增长速度. 企业负担增加是不争的事实, 而从长远来看,, 资本逃逸是不可避免的.

解决之道在于政府较小, 包括项目审批流程的减少, 在公务员的大规模解雇, 减少各种无效投资的, 并大幅减税. 其结果将是,人们的收入增长将超过国内生产总值的, 和税收的增长将低于GDP.

这是一个删节翻译 中国的文章 张贴在新浪作者的个人博客. 达·芬是一个知名的互联网博客和股票分析师. 写作pseudonymously, 达·芬生产的物品大批量分析中国股市和经济问题, 是中国最具影响力的金融博客之一, 注册数百万读者每月.

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A water container delivery worker drives on a street in Beijing on Dec. 9, 2016.  Economist Ma Guangyuan says that China needs to develop genuine property rights to enhance economic growth. (Nicolas Asfouri/AFP/Getty Images)A water container delivery worker drives on a street in Beijing on Dec. 9, 2016.  Economist Ma Guangyuan says that China needs to develop genuine property rights to enhance economic growth. (Nicolas Asfouri/AFP/Getty Images)

During a sea battle in 1571, a Turkish general hid 150,000 gold coins in the cabin of his warship. He was defeated, and his entire wealth ended up at the bottom of the sea. Why did he bring along all this gold when going off to war? There was no property protection in Turkey back then. People’s belongings could be stolen or confiscated at any time.

Scottish economist Adam Smith, in his now classic book An Inquiry into the Nature and Cause of the Wealth of Nations, first published in 1776, made a comment that still holds true today: “In a rude state of society… The individuals, who hoard whatever money they can save, and who conceal their hoard, do so from a distrust of the justice of government, from a fear that if it was known that they had a hoard, and where that hoard was to be found, they would quickly be plundered.”

This now brings me to China’s present economic situation and the need to address private property protection that was recently laid out by senior Chinese officials in a published document.

How important are property rights?

The right to own property is the cornerstone of a healthy economy, the foundation of trust, the premise for innovation, and the key and prerequisite for understanding economic growth since the time of the Industrial Revolution.

我们. financial expert William Bernstein, in his best-selling book The Birth of Plenty, How the Prosperity of the Modern World was Created, attributes this rapid economic growth to four factors: property rights, scientific rationalism, capital markets, and efficient communication and transportation systems. He argues that a country can only prosper when all four factors are in place. 此外, he ranks property rights at the top. In his view, the protection of private property is the very premise and foundation of an economy.

Being able to own wealth motivates people in their pursuit of success and happiness. Whether a country has laws that allow citizens to acquire wealth, and provides legal protection for this wealth, is not only of great importance to the wellbeing of the individual, but also vital to the development of society as a whole.

在他的 1981 book Structure and Change in Economic History, renowned economist Douglass C. North states that by comparing economic effects of different social systems over a long period of time, he discovered that countries that guaranteed property rights and provided a predictable solution to economic disputes, create an optimal environment for economic development. The rise and fall of Western powers, and the ups and downs of modern countries, have proven this point: countries that protect private property rights can overcome various traps in the process of development. Britain and the Netherlands surpassed France and Spain in the 17th century mainly because of their effective recognition of property rights and their robust political and legal systems.

在中国, where state ownership predominates, the development of a property rights protection system has not been easy. The conception of a free market economy, private property rights, and the introduction of property laws, are steps that require the hard work and lofty ideas of many individuals.

The provision of laws in China means that property rights are not, 事实上, being properly protected. We can see that in actuality there are still many deficiencies in the protection of property rights, especially in the protection of private entrepreneurs. During the past years, some entrepreneurs under investigation, even when proven innocent, found it difficult to continue running their businesses, and in some cases their assets were even seized. With irregular business practices being the norm in China, entrepreneurs live in a constant fear of punishment. This environment has become a big factor in Chinese entrepreneurs’ lack of trust in long-term economic prospects.

The recently published document specifically mentions these prominent issues: The use of state power against private property rights, and frequent illegal sealing, seizure, and freezing of private property. It also stresses the need to protect the various forms of economic entities as well as citizens’ property rights according to law and to enhance people’s sense of confidence regarding the security of property and wealth.

As China is determined to become an innovative economy, the importance of property rights protections is more urgent than ever. Negative expectations in regards to property rights have an unprecedented impact on China’s future. The key to whether China can become a country of innovation is tied to the respect of property rights and the rule of law. It is the premise and key of China’s successful economic transformation.

In a country where private property right are violated every day, entrepreneurs will not feel the impetus for innovation. Why do Chinese entrepreneurs transfer large amounts of assets overseas? And why do Chinese companies show so little motivation to innovate? The answer lies in the lack of property rights. This is the problem.

This is an abridged translation of Ma Guangyuan’s Chinese article, posted to his public WeChat account 11月. 30, 2016. 马光远是中国知名的独立经济学家. Ma appears as a financial commentator on China Central Television, and his columns have been published in Financial Times Chinese, 南都周刊, and elsewhere.

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Deng Xiaoping’s ‘cat theory,“由政治漫画家反叛模仿辣椒. (反叛辣椒)Deng Xiaoping’s ‘cat theory,“由政治漫画家反叛模仿辣椒. (反叛辣椒)

编者按: 中国经济的快速增长,在过去的三十年开始了私有化进程推进由前中国共产党领导人邓小平. 文革期间继极端的政治压迫的十年, 邓小平提出了他著名的“猫论”来传播他引进了资本主义市场经济. 该理论状态: “如果猫是黑还是白不要紧; 只要抓住老鼠, 这是一个好猫。“在本质, 在“黑猫”与“白猫”代表“计划经济”和“市场经济,“而邓说,哪一个能够完成任务将获得通过. 然而, 多于 30 年邓小平宣布后, 随着中国经济的持续低迷, 大规模的政府腐败, 和极端的社会不平等, 现在许多人质疑中国的经济模式. 下面的博客文章中就是一个例子.

In Deng Xiaoping’s home, 有一个由著名画家陈Liantao称为“两只猫”画. 在中国书法题词说:: “如果猫是黑还是白不要紧; 只要抓住老鼠, 这是一个好猫。“

在 1985, 邓小平被评为“年度人物”的 时间 杂志. 白猫, 黑猫理论还发表在 时间 杂志. 那年, 邓小平的“猫论”,从中国传播到世界. 由于的十一届三中全会 11 共产党的全国代表大会, 的“猫论”已成为中国转变经济发展理论大关.

猫抓老鼠

猫是天生的捕鼠. 人类具有人性, 没有人们不是人类. 但人类也有自私的一面, 一种倾向,他们自身的利益照顾. 几乎每个人都想发财, 从天子到庶民.

企业共享相同的性质在市场竞争方面. 为“捕鼠”冲动是民营企业和国有企业完全不同. 民营企业通过自身利益的强烈冲动驱动, 类似于野猫的性质. 国有企业是不同的, 因为“捕鼠”是没有直接关系的“食老鼠。”因此,他们的性质已经改变. 例如, Chu Shijian created the 红寺香烟 王国,每年支付数百亿人民币的税金. 但最终, 楚被判处有期徒刑十年的只是偷了“小鱼”。中国共产党政权在做鱼的猫的样子, 但并没有让猫吃.

允许所有猫抓老鼠

有些猫为什么能抓到老鼠, 但其他人不能? 在给定的社会环境, 这取决于他们是否允许这样做, 或者哪些是允许这样做. 所有的猫有本质抓老鼠. 但是,如果有些猫被关在笼子里关, 他们无法抓住老鼠. 从这个角度看, 语句“不管白猫还是黑猫, 谁抓住老鼠猫就是好猫“是个伪命题.

同样是一个有利可图的行业真正的. 以金融业为例, 它是更容易为国有资本进入的领域, 但非常困难的民营企业进入. 难道民营企业不知道如何管理自己的财务状况? 当然不是. 为了保护“状态的猫,“一些”野猫“不准捉”老鼠“在一个不平等的市场环境, 这是不可能知道哪个猫是好猫.

猫抓老鼠不是成功的秘诀. 成功的秘诀是,我们都可以捕鼠. 为什么你是唯一一个允许抓老鼠?

并非所有Rich猫是好猫

白猫还是黑猫, 那些谁成为先富起来的人不一定就是好猫. 让一部分人先富起来的是一个战略“猫论”。这种战略使中国的一些人成为世界级富豪. 这也让中国成长为世界第二大经济强国. 然而, 不允许白猫捉住老鼠做黑猫变得非常大. 之后黑猫变得富有, 他们没有打算让白色猫捕鼠加入他们的行列.

在中国改革之后的三十年, 绝大多数丰富的中国企业家和富豪都受益有一定的这种固有的不公正的系统扩展. 你抓到老鼠的原因是不是因为你比马云更强大, 但由于你允许你的主人这样做.

功能失调性分配系统

需很长时间, 一个危险的经济政策倾向占了上风: 引入“需求方”或“供给方”的政策. 这些最终让他们谋取利益推动少数人的利益,. 事实上, 很多时候政策作了全体人民受益, 但他们往往最终受益只有少数人. 这就是现实.

“需求方”和“供方”的西方经济体发展的改革都无法解开中国经济困局. 中国经济真正的问题是,它的“分配”机制退化. 它不能调节社会利益的公平分配. 该机器的“配电侧”生锈了关闭. 事实上, 它正在加速富人越来越富的过程, 和穷人越来越穷.

以往, 我们用于指功能障碍中的分配系统,收入分配的一个问题. 事实上, 这是一种片面的看法. 在今天的中国社会, 致富的途径是多元化, 收入是只有一个信道,并且不再主通道. 无论多么富有的大款, 谁成为富人劳动收入? 很少.

有多数人致富,不能仅限于劳动收入. 从劳动收入是有限的. 人们需要的知识, 首都, 人与人之间的关系, 和机会. 例如, 如果一个小店主想开一家店或扩大他的生意, 他需要的流动性. 获取资本是他关键. 没有资金,只有从他的收入依靠积蓄, 他可能无法实现他开店的梦想.

融资机会都涉及到资金的分配, 获取知识和教育. 机会积累财富都涉及到社会公平和公正. 如何一个社会所有社会成员之间的分配同样的资源,不仅是收入分配的问题, 也是公平竞争的问题. 没有公平竞争, 机会控制或垄断由少数人,社会将加速财富两极分化.

为什么黑猫比白人胖的猫? 这不是因为在它们的基因的差异, 或认为黑猫不聪明, 更强大, 或加把劲. 问题在于与业主.

范迪安是北京大学和中山大学大学的独立经济学家和兼职教授. 他获得了博士学位. 在加州大学, 伯克利, 由北京大学厉以宁和诺贝尔文学奖得主乔治·阿克洛夫亚瑟监督. 范一直是高级管理人员和顾问各大银行, 金融公司, 和大型企业. 这是发表在9月的一篇文章的删节翻译. 9, 2016 在他的公众微信账号.

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一位年长的中国农民站在她家门外的农田被新的住房发展北京以外的背靠月. 21, 2014. (凯文Frayer /盖蒂图片社)一位年长的中国农民站在她家门外的农田被新的住房发展北京以外的背靠月. 21, 2014. (凯文Frayer /盖蒂图片社)

中国的政府规模是巨大的. 通过 2007 中国的财政收入已经达到 5.1 万亿元 ($770 十亿), 占 21 占GDP的百分比,是相当于 370 万城镇居民年可支配收入 - 或者每年的纯收入 1.23 十亿农民.

帝制中国的财政收入

中国如何的在共产党统治的财政收入下帝国统治时代的比较? 在 1766, 乾隆中期时代, 政府的财政收入 49.37 白银万两.

荷兰东印度公司进行的各地详细调查 1760 收入和消费的人在北京和广州. 据历史档案, 一个普通北京人年收入约为 24 两. 因此, 49.37 白银万两相当于 2.05 万普通北京市民的年收入. 单单是收入 2.05 百万北京市民就足以支撑整个乾隆政府. 明显, 这是一个小政府.

当然, 有些人可能会说,我们不能以时间过去比较任何国家的政府收入和支出, 因为这些都是传统的农业经济, 和政府收入都很低,因此. 现代经济, 然而, 是复杂的,依赖于各种政府援助. 这种推理使得一定量的感. 所以, 让我们用一个不同的例子.

美国的财政收入

让我们用美国, 一个现代化国家, 与今天的中国进行比较. 美国. 金融证券市场, 知识产权部门, 和民营企业最发达的世界. 此外, 它也扮演世界警察角色. 因此, 其政府支出不会比任何其他国家的低.

在 2007 美国. 联邦政府的财政收入 $2.4 兆, 要么 18 占GDP的百分比, 和相当于 85 百万普通美国公民的年可支配收入. 也就是说, 为了支持U.S. 政府支出, 用了 85 万美国人可支配收入. 这远远低于下 370 所需万中国城市居民支持中国政府在 2007.

中国有 540 万城镇居民, 和 800 万农民. 他们的可支配收入,去年总有人 10.7 万亿元 ($1.62 兆). 中国政府的财政收入 50 中国公民可支配总收入的百分比.

相比之下, 在美国的总可支配收入为 $8.4 兆. 该 $2.4 万亿政府财政收入等于中美的四分之一. 居民可支配收入.

从而, 中国政府比中美大得多. 政府财政预算方面.

私人财富结构比较

中国公民做自己的财富, 包括房地产, 企业股权, 金融证券, 银行存款, 等等. 但是,这些市民主要是城镇居民. 中国农民不拥有土地, 它们也没有多少积蓄. 他们几乎没有财富.

据国家发展和改革委员会 (国家发改委) 估计, 通过的端 2005, 中国城镇居民的总资产价值为 20.6 万亿元 ($3.11 兆). 如果添加 15 %,达到调整通货膨胀, 它会一直 27.6 万亿元 ($4.17 兆) 通过的端 2015, 的不到三分之一 88 万亿元的国有资产和国有土地.

中国的民营和国有资产的总额为 115.6 万亿元 ($17.5 兆), 相当于 4.7 GDP次. 相反, 美国. 政府基本上没有自己的收入产生资产. 它仅持有少量土地. 通过的端 2007, 在美国的私人总资产 $73 兆, 5.4 国内生产总值倍,总资产与GDP的中国的比例略高.

虽然总资产和两国国内生产总值的比例大致相同, 人民和政府之间的财富分配是完全不同的. 在中国, 多于 76 资产的%是由国有, 与人拥有不到四分之一. 在美国, 资产基本上都在人民的手中.

中国对 115.6 万亿元财富的 2007, 只要 27.6 兆 ($4.17 兆) 属于人民, 剩下的 88 万亿元 ($13.3 兆) 由国有. 如果 2008, 中国的资产价值和GDP增长 10 百分, 那么公民个人赚 2.76 万亿元, 而政府赚了 8.8 万亿元. 政府的经济增长资产升值的份额三倍的. 这就是为什么资产升值推动中国的国内需求或提高国内消费因此影响不大的原因.

在哪里,政府的钱到哪里去了?

我上面提到的,政府的财政收入 5.1 万亿元 ($770 十亿) 去年, 国有资产和土地升值至少 9 万亿元 ($1.36 兆). 国有企业有利润 1.6 万亿元 ($240 十亿). 政府有一个总收入 15.7 万亿元 ($2.37 兆). 这笔钱是如何花?

据前财政部部长谢旭人, 在 2007, 中国政府对人民如医疗直接支出, 社会保障和就业福利总额约 600 十亿人民币 ($90.6 十亿). 这相当于 15 总支出的百分比和 2.4 全年国内生产总值的百分比. 除以 1.3 十亿人, 社会支出人均为 461 yuan ($69), 其等于 3 城镇居民人均可支配收入的百分比.

在美国, 政府在同一三类支出 2015 正要 $1.5 兆, 要么 61 联邦总支出的百分比, 和 11.5 占GDP的百分比. 人均支出 $5,000 当由分 300 中美百万. 人口, 它相当于 18 美国人均可支配收入的百分比.

这并不是说中国政府不花钱, 但它缺乏预算过程的监督实. 中国政府往往会浪费在高调的基础设施项目和政府办公大楼的钱, 并投资于具有高资源消耗产业, 高污染,低创造就业机会. 此外, 这一切都为腐败提供了温床.

因为在中国有太多的资产财富和收入在政府手中, 这是困难的人民群众,以赚取更多和消费更多, 和服务行业发展的人们的生计. 从而, 其中,将要求和投资第三产业从何而来?

陈志武是美国耶鲁大学金融学教授. 这是张贴在网站上Aisixiang他的中国语言文章的删节翻译, 并在广泛再版 中国语言互联网.

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客户和房地产经纪人看几家建筑模型在房地产展览会在嘉善, 浙江省10月. 19, 2012. (AFP / AFP / Getty图像)客户和房地产经纪人看几家建筑模型在房地产展览会在嘉善, 浙江省10月. 19, 2012. (AFP / AFP / Getty图像)

中国的房地产市场是类似于与政府充当庄家庞氏骗局, 裁判, 和大玩家. 该市场由完全的贷款撑起.

从市场的角度来看, 中国的房地产有没有投资价值. 考虑其投资产品, 一个人需要先考察泡沫的依据三个指标的存在: 房地产投资与GDP之间的比例, 价格收入比, 而租售比.

房地产投资占GDP的比率主要是用于评估预期的未来价格,投资是否房地产过热. 中国的房地产投资和占GDP的比例一直居高不下: 14.8 %的 2013 和 14.18 %的 2015.

以来 1960, 在国家的房地产泡沫已经破灭的所有的地方房地产投资占GDP的比例均高于 6 百分 . 当日本房地产市场崩溃, 房地产投资只占 9 占GDP的百分比. 在U.S的开始. 次贷危机, 的比例达到局部峰值 6.2 百分.

其他数据, 比如住房负担能力, 以及来自住房租金收入, 表明房地产持有几乎没有任何兴趣,在中国一类资产, 和比赌博好一点.

那么,为什么中国政府允许使用大量的贷款,以支持房地产?

房地产依赖性疾病

中国的经济正从房地产依赖症患, 这主要是因为地方政府在经济上依赖于土地.

中国的地方政府都赚钱,卖地在中国所有的土地是国有的. 之间 2003 和 2015, 他们的土地依存度 (土地出让金一般预算收入的比例) 平均近 50 百分 .

例如, 苏州市, 一二线城市, 有平均土地依存度 82.6 今年前8个月百分比 2016, 从 40.58 %的 2015. 在杭州, 合肥, 南京等城市, 土地的依赖比率也高于 50 百分. 因此, 地方政府必须在住房市场作为大牌球员,并保持土地供应市场.

此外, 房地产行业在中国经济中的重要地位. 像......一样早 2009, Yu Bin, 宏观经济研究部主席在中国国务院, 公开表示,房地产行业占 6.6 占GDP的比重和投资的四分之一, 具有高达 60 直接相关产业, 并已成为中国经济的直接命脉. 一旦有巨大的房地产市场的波动, 几十个行业依靠房地产将遭受不可估量的损失,甚至可能导致中国实体经济崩溃.

现在, 与低迷的经济, 将中国政权做什么,如果房地产崩溃? 因此, 央行必须在经销商处,并保持发行货币和分发骰子地方政府, 房地产开发商, 和买家, 他们赌博.

政治生存

但从市场经济的角度, 中国的房地产热潮将死. 事实上, 世界经历了房地产泡沫约一百倍. 在最后 20 年份, 我们看到在日本的崩溃, 全球第二大GDP, 和美国, 世界上最大的国内生产总值. 而在日本气泡慢慢放气, 美国遭受的瞬间崩溃.

过去的经验告诉我们,中国的房地产泡沫将破裂迟早. 唯一的问题是,如何将崩溃.

对于中国政府房地产崩溃的后果非常严重. 下跌的第一张骨牌将是地方债务危机, 其次是金融危机. 所以, 在政府的看法, 房地产是一个必须想尽一切办法要保存的行业. 在 2015, 多数的 11 万亿元的新增贷款发出去了房地产市场. 这种趋势在继续 2016 而且可能超越 2015. 因此, 可以预计,只要央行继续发出贷款, 房价会继续上涨.

在美国, 庞氏骗局破产了,因为球员, 银行, 和政府 (裁判) 与不同利益各方. 在中国,政府是裁判员, 央行经销商, 和地方政府的球员.

在中国的房地产已经成为央行的货币总库. 直供房地产市场信用已经成为中国政府保持经济稳定的方法. 这种方法的最严重的后果是通胀. 然而, 通胀不仅减少社会财富. 它不创建外部军事威胁或难以抑制内部冲突, 它不会直接导致政权垮台. 津巴布韦的恶性通货膨胀比中国更糟糕很多次,但并没有导致政权的倒台.

此外, 中国政府不久前制定了一套市场控制, 如限购, 销售限制, 和涨跌停板. 它使用它们就是了任何方式. 由于政府是裁判, 零售商, 和大玩家, 泡沫可以成为比日本和美国的那些大得多. 而政府有更多的回旋余地.

何清涟是中国著名作家和经济学家. 目前总部设在美国, 她撰写的“中国的陷阱,“其中涉及的腐败在中国的20世纪90年代的经济改革, 和“审查的迷雾: 在中国的媒体控制,“既解决了压机的操作和限制. 她对当代中国社会和经济问题定期写.

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一组潜在的房地产买家来看地产计划通过在物业展在上海本地开发商在三月 19, 2006. (马克·罗斯顿/法新社/盖蒂图片社)一组潜在的房地产买家来看地产计划通过在物业展在上海本地开发商在三月 19, 2006. (马克·罗斯顿/法新社/盖蒂图片社)

编者按: 了数年, 无论中国西方经济学家纷纷发表意见,超出控制中国的房地产泡沫. 根据所有迹象, 泡沫要破灭已经是很久以前. 但hasn't-理由自身所有的. 本文由蔡参坤揭露中国的一些扭曲的房地产市场动态.

在北京这几天的头号饭桌上的谈话是炽热的房地产市场. 似乎有北京的楼市没有限制; 它拥有最昂贵的房地产项目, 买家人数最多, 而最疯狂的投资活动.

在......的最后 2014, 我的一个朋友买了一间公寓位于西四环路下 50,000 元每平米 (关于 $740 每平方英尺). 现在,它是在高估 100,000 元每平米. 另一位朋友买了河北固安一个属性去年 7,000 元每平米, 它是现在价值超过 20,000 元每平米. 然而,另一位朋友在天津武清今年早些时候带来了财产 10,000 元每平米. 已经, 它也是价值超过 20,000 元每平米.

这不单纯是一个经济问题, 但也对政权的存亡.

在深圳和上海的房价也暴涨. 谁预测,一线城市的下滑怀疑论者现在很安静,也加入了购房者的花车.

随着中国经济的衰退, 它已成为越来越难赚钱. 人们发现,购买和出售房地产是致富的唯一途径, 致富快.

随着九月的. 5, 304 性能超过价格 100,000 万元每平方米,今年已售出, 近五倍之多, 63 周围的同时出售 2015. 此外, 创纪录数量的 3,849 房屋售价超过 10 万元已售出.

金华辰的社会, 地处偏远山区, 刚刚获得了“大满贯”奖. 据开发商发布的数据, 156 四间卧室的公寓平均价格为800万元被抢购一空 40 分钟后,销售开始在 9:30 上午. 四个单位的平均每分钟售出, 与自线等待买家 6:00 上午. 开发商票房 1.3 十亿人民币在一天.

泡沫

似乎人们并不需要担心,中国有一个大的房地产泡沫. 一家公司的领导者的观察是非常有特点. 他说过, 根据人均收入, 没有多少人能买得起北京购买房产, 上海或深圳. 房地产泡沫的破灭是姗姗来迟, 他说, 但泡沫越来越大,牢不可破的原因是因为从银行支持. 如若房地产泡沫破灭, 银行就垮了, 随后由政府. 因此,政府尽一切努力防止泡沫爆裂. 这不单纯是一个经济问题, 但也对政权的存亡.

住房贷款占了大多数最银行信贷. 在今年的第一季度末, 18 中国上市银行共持有 14.12 万亿元 ($2.1 兆) 在住房抵押贷款. 这还不包括给开发商的巨额开发贷款. 在 2016 许多银行推出了房屋净值贷款计划, 他们大多是在量 3 万元 ($450,000) 或者更多. 有些银行甚至没有上限. 银行因而对房地产市场的火爆给予了巨大的支持.

许多人的发言不同意,房地产绑架了中国经济. 目前看来,房地产不仅绑架了中国经济, 而且银行, 派对, 和每一个家庭和个人谁购买通过贷款房地产.

根据市场规律, 房企不仅上去, 他们也回落. 境外市场的政治因素也会影响房地产价格. “中国模式”是人们谈论的是指实际上对中国特有的房地产财富积累模式. 当一个国家的 1.3 十亿人份香港的例子, 绑土地收入, 怎么可能房地产价格上不去?

许多人的发言不同意,房地产绑架了中国经济. 目前看来,房地产不仅绑架了中国经济, 而且银行, 派对, 和每一个家庭和个人谁购买通过贷款房地产. 从一开始, 中国房地产市场并不看好更好的生活条件提供房屋. 这是不是一个正常的房地产市场. 它是所有关于政治.

腐败

许多因素都推高了中国的房地产价格. 除了货币发行, 土地财政, 与政府干预, 也有腐败. 几乎每一个倒下的贪官拥有多个房屋.

在今天的房地产市场, 普通老百姓买不起一个家, 但贪官拥有大量物业. 它促进无力感和沮丧的人之间的浓浓. 事实上, 住房已成为硬通货. 贪官“多套住房的所有权告诉人们,权力的滥用确实是在中国很严重.

在......的最后 1979, 中国的人民币货币供应 (M2) 是 155.5 十亿人民币. 在 2006, M2达到创纪录 30 万亿元 ($4.5 兆), 在 2016 它已经飙升至 141 万亿元, 同比增长近 1,000 倍以上 1979. 因为中国的实体经济关系不大推荐它, 这种大规模的资本只能在流通楼市, 从而不断提高房价. 在这个充满激情的环境, 人们似乎已经失去了合理性和意义的数字. 无论多少新的属性如何来在市场上, 它会出卖 - 现在.

这是蔡参锟的删节翻译 中国的文章, 张贴在作者的个人博客. 蔡参昆是中国知名经济学家和博客. 他为多家著名商业网站写道列,被评为十大影响力博客上凤凰卫视的网站上连续三年作家.

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A general view of buildings in the abandoned Qingquan Steel plant which closed in 2014 and became one of several so-called 'zombie factories' in Tangshan on Jan. 26, 2016. (凯文Frayer /盖蒂图片社)A general view of buildings in the abandoned Qingquan Steel plant which closed in 2014 and became one of several so-called 'zombie factories' in Tangshan on Jan. 26, 2016. (凯文Frayer /盖蒂图片社)

This is the final of a four part series. Parts , , 和 three were published previously.

Since Marx created his communist theory, China’s has become the first capitalist economic system under communist party rule. 中国共产党 (CCP) started its reign by eliminating capitalism—transforming private ownership into state ownership—but was unable to create a successful socialist economic system. It finally had to switch back to a capitalist system to extend its rule.

During the reform to private ownership, CCP officials at all levels, and their families, became entrepreneurs, large property owners, and huge financial asset owners. Their process of wealth accumulation has been one of darkness and crime. They thus needed the red regime to protect their property and lives, and they also needed government monopolies to continue amassing more wealth. 因此, these people are the strong supporters of China’s current system, rather than facilitators of democratization.

Unlawful Misappropriation

How did the CCP’s red elite go from owning nothing to becoming super wealthy in a short period of 20 至 30 年份? This is the communist-capitalists’ secret and the guide to understanding the communist capitalist system and the future political direction of the CCP interest groups. Basically, they achieved it through unlawful misappropriation of public assets, maintaining monopolies of important industries, and by manipulating policies to gain benefits and maintain their authoritarian rule.

Cheng Xiaonong (NTD)

Unlawful misappropriation of public assets refers to the CCP elite directly taking over small and medium-sized state-owned enterprises (SOE) and obtaining free shares in large SOEs during the privatization process.

Maintaining monopoly industries refers to large SOE’s in the financial, 能源, electricity, 运输, 电信, and other industries in which the red elite or their second generation offspring occupy key positions. Some of these enterprises are among the world’s top 500 企业. They provide large amounts of tax revenues to support the regime and allowed the red elite to quickly become rich through acquiring shares, kickbacks, pay and bonuses.

By influencing and manipulating policy-making, the red elite and their relatives were the first to get involved in many industries and projects and hence easily gained tremendous benefits.

Maintaining authoritarian rule refers to the red elite’s extreme hostility to democratization and to their hope to eternally keep the red regime in power, so as to permanently have their privileges and huge amounts of illicit wealth be protected by the CCP regime.

Red Capitalists

When a large number of China’s enterprises and wealth lie in the hands of red capitalists, the only reliable system of protection for them is neither market economy nor the rule of law, but “the proletarian class dictatorship,” which means their permanent dictatorship over all other members of society.

They clearly know that the traditional socialist economic system is not workable; they have access to wealth that is more readily available than wealth earned by entrepreneurs in democratic counties; they also have an excellent political position without competition, and they are able to prevent political democratization that might lead to political and economic liquidation. This is the essence of the “China model.”

An elderly Chinese farmer stands outside her home on farmland backdropped by a new housing development in Hebei on Nov. 21, 2014. (凯文Frayer /盖蒂图片社)

明显, under the CCP’s regime, this red capitalism will not spontaneously transform into a capitalist democratic system. 需很长时间, Western scholars have held the belief that, after economic liberalization, the red elite will naturally embrace democracy and freedom. China’s transformation has proven this idea to not only be naive, but also wrong.

然而, the red elite is also very clear about the fact that the China model faces constant threats from the bottom of society. 因此, they have been transferring personal assets to Western countries while arranging for their family members to immigrate to Western countries should the need arise. This indicates that the future of the “China model” is actually very fragile.

Revisiting Marx

在早期的 1989, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, a German NGO, arranged for several visiting scholars to visit the Karl Marx House in Trier. Someone wrote in Chinese: “先生. 马克思, you really harmed us.”

Now it seems this statement was only half right, as Marxism was also harmed by the China model. If Marx were able to comment on today’s communist capitalism, he might be irritated and pleased at the same time. Irritated, because communists have married their enemy in order to survive; and pleased that a few communists are still around, no matter what kind of anti-Marxist theories they employed. So Marx might feel that he hasn’t become totally irrelevant.

But Marx would still be disconcerted by a huge contradiction. According to his theoretical framework “the economic base determines the superstructure,” and “advanced productive forces inevitably change a backward superstructure.” However, the China model would force Marx to completely overthrow his core concepts and thus the entire Marxist ideology, because under the present communist capitalist system, the superstructure of the “proletarian dictatorship” relies, 事实上, on the economic base of capitalism.

A broken desk is seen at the top of an enclosed conveyer belt at an abandoned chemical factory on the outskirts of Beijing on April 4, 2016. (格雷格·贝克/法新社/盖蒂图片社)

所以, the big question remains on what the fate of this residual superstructure of the old socialist economic base will be. Is it to be totally eliminated on the scrap pile of history, or does it indeed contain an “advanced” nature that will inevitably breed a new communist revolution to eradicate communist capitalism?

Alternatively, in order to learn from the China model, Marx might need to update his theory from, “the economic base determines the superstructure” to, “the superstructure determines the economic base.” This would not only be a tough lesson for Marx to face, but also poses an unavoidable ideological crisis for the CCP.

Marx is still revered by the CCP because he provides ideological legitimacy to the privileged red bourgeoisie as well as to the continuation of the “dictatorship of the proletariat” model. The paradox is that the China model itself is anti-Marxist.

The CCP’s trick of survival is to hold the banner of Marxism while building and consolidating a capitalist economic system that is the opposite of Marxism. The China model thus is opposed to both Marxism and democracy.

博士. 程晓农是中国的政治和经济基础,在新泽西州的学者. 他是中国人民大学的毕业生, 在那里他获得了硕士学位经济学, 和普林斯顿大学, 在那里,他获得博士学位社会学. 在中国, 程是一个政策研究员和助手前总书记赵紫阳, 当赵是总理. 程一直在哥廷根和普林斯顿大学的访问学者, 他担任了现代中国研究杂志主编. 他的评论和列经常出现在海外的中国媒体.

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A couple walks on a street at an abandoned industrial area of Houjie town in Donggyuan on Jan. 27, 2016. (Lam Yik Fei/Getty Images)A couple walks on a street at an abandoned industrial area of Houjie town in Donggyuan on Jan. 27, 2016. (Lam Yik Fei/Getty Images)

The privatization process of China’s state-owned enterprises (SOE) has been a process of building a capitalist economic system. Different methods of privatization lead to different forms of capitalism. 在......的最后 1997, Zhu Rongji launched SOE reforms. This policy was called “Seizing the Big and Letting Go of the Small.”

“Seizing the Big” meant maintaining control over SOEs that owned large-scale assets and those related to national interests in finance, 能源, electricity, 电信, 运输, 等等. After restructuring, these enterprises were allowed to list on stock exchanges, and they could sell part of their shares to Chinese citizens and foreign investment. 然而, the state still owned the majority shares — meaning that the government continues to “seize” these companies.

“Letting Go of the Small” meant allowing privatization of small SOEs and those with serious losses, so as to rid the government of the burden. The consideration for privatization of small and medium-sized SOEs was who would buy them and in what way. In those days, the average monthly salaries of SOE directors and managers were only a few hundred yuan. Even the red elite and their relatives did not have significant financial assets.

The approach the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came up with was to order SOE managers to get bank loans, and use the SOEs as collateral for “buying” state property. It then allowed the managers to re-register the SOEs in their names or in the name of a family member. 然后, as business owners, they would use business funds to repay the private loans.

Another approach used was for SOE managers to force employees to purchase a part of the business. Employees had to use their family savings to buy into the company in order to keep their jobs. But employees were not allowed to get involved with the transfer of business assets. They were forced to supply funds so that the managers could get ownership of the business.

与此同时, the authorities allowed families of those in power to acquire shares in large listed enterprises through their personal networks. They received free shares and made huge profits when stock prices went up.

Two Privatization Phases

China’s privatization began in the second half of 1997 and was basically completed in 2009. 在 1996 China had 110,000 国有企业, and at the end of 2008 曾经有 9,700 剩下, including partially privatized large SOEs with the government owning the majority of shares. Privatization was divided into two phases.

The first phase, 从 1997 至 2001, was the privatization of small and medium-sized SOEs. Most of these enterprises were privatized by SOE directors and managers.

I analyzed 130 cases of privatization from 29 provinces and summed up several typical tricks and the darkness of the process as part of the research for my dissertation. Their approach was usually to deliberately understate the net assets of the enterprise. Managers then bought the business, using business funds or loans from banks or private borrowers and registered the company in their own name or a relative’s name. 最后, with the new business owner’s identity, they would pay back the borrowed funds with income from the enterprise. They basically paid little to nothing for these SOEs.

A general view of buildings in the abandoned Qingquan Steel plant which closed in 2014 and became one of several so-called ‘zombie factories’ in Tanghsan on Jan. 26, 2016. (凯文Frayer /盖蒂图片社)

The second phase, 从 2002 至 2009, was partial privatization of medium and large-sized SOEs. The approach included listing SOEs after restructuring, managerial ownership transfer, demutualization of workers, foreign joint ventures, and joint ventures with private enterprises. Because these enterprises owned large-scale assets, management could not afford to take on ownership all by themselves. They usually used business funds to buy shares and distributed shares to management cadres, as well as to officials and families who helped approve the listing, forming a common interest group. These SOE cadres and government officials became owners, general managers or board members of medium and large-sized listed companies without any cost to themselves, and they became wealthy.

According to data from two nationwide sample surveys, 关于 50-60 percent of China’s privatized or semi-privatized enterprises are owned by enterprise management teams. Approximately 25 percent of the buyers were investors from outside of the enterprises; 少于 2 percent of shares are held by foreign investment; 和小于 10 percent of enterprises are co-owned by management and workers. The management does not allow employee shareholders to be involved in asset managements and transfers.

This type of privatization is equivalent to workers paying management to own the enterprises. This “SOE reform” could be called public robbery and distribution of assets among corporate management, local government officials and the children of officials. In any case, the authorities can not legitimately justify this predatory behavior. Open disclosure would lead to public outrage. 因此, the government does not allow domestic media to discuss privatization, and Chinese scholars are not allowed to research the privatization process.

Workers’ Social Benefits Dropped

从 1998 至 2003, when the red elite misappropriated SMEs on a large scale through privatization, the authorities deliberately closed the Administrative Bureau of State-Owned Property for six years during the crucial climax of privatization, to provide convenience to the red elite. Although in 2003 the bureau was restored, it rarely investigated state-owned asset misappropriation.

之间 1997 和 2005, large-scale labor conflicts took place across China sparked by misappropriation of public assets related to privatization. The government basically stood with management because officials also benefited from privatization. During China’s privatization, the original welfare system based on SOE collapsed. Many companies gave workers very little money and drove them away. 当时, the CCP used propaganda that laying off SOE workers was a necessary sacrifice of the reform. The government did not want to build a unified unemployment benefits system for those workers and tossed the problem to the management teams. If the head of the company did not want to pay, the government did not intervene. Thus the CCP shamelessly shirked its responsibility to provide social welfare to the workers.

Demolition workers take a rest after cleaning up an abandoned building at the Shougang Capital Iron and Steel Plant in Beijing on May 28, 2015. (格雷格·贝克/法新社/盖蒂图片社)

相比之下, during Russia’s privatization process, the social welfare system still functioned, and some unemployed workers were able to receive a minimal amount of social welfare. The Russian government never implemented the forced layoff policy and used tax incentives to encourage companies to retain workers. Employees owned about 40 percent of the privatized enterprises.

Compared to the privatization of Central European countries and Russia, the privatization in China was the most unjust and the most ruthless. 明确地, the economic restructuring under an autocracy can disregard social justice without fear of electoral pressure. To the elite, this model is naturally more desirable, but the sentiment among the general public is probably the opposite.

Some western scholars are of the opinion that the authoritarian communist regimes were good for economic restructuring and economic development, because they were able to overcome resistance from the people, and China was often cited as their best example. 然而, the privatization process in China demonstrates that a totalitarian government tends to ignore social justice, deprives people of their rights and interests, and make arrangements in favor of the ruling elite.

博士. 程晓农是中国的政治和经济基础,在新泽西州的学者. 他是中国人民大学的毕业生, 在那里他获得了硕士学位经济学, 和普林斯顿大学, 在那里,他获得博士学位社会学. 在中国, 程是一个政策研究员和助手前总书记赵紫阳, 当赵是总理. 程一直在哥廷根和普林斯顿大学的访问学者, 他担任了现代中国研究杂志主编. 他的评论和列经常出现在海外的中国媒体.

To read parts 12 in this series.

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唐山首钢总公司的迁安钢厂的普遍看法上一月. 20, 2016. (Xiaolu Chu/Getty Images)唐山首钢总公司的迁安钢厂的普遍看法上一月. 20, 2016. (Xiaolu Chu/Getty Images)

一年一度的财富 500 名单公布于七月 20. 中国公司的数量已从 106 在 2015 至 110 今年, 多于 20 总榜单的百分比,靠近中美数量. 公司. 十三中国企业, 包括万科, 使得列表的第一次上.

幸运 500 被视为全球经济的一面镜子. 这些年来, 尽管全球经济格局已经发生了巨大变化, 注重财富 500 没有太大的改变. 幸运 500 公司占约 40 全球产量的百分比, 50 国际贸易的百分之, 60 国际技术贸易的百分比, 和 90 国际直接投资的百分比. 它确实代表了一个国家的经济实力,是一个国家最重要的“名片”。

然而, 当我们研究行业分布, 盈利能力, 国际影响力, 和品牌竞争力, 这些 110 中国企业完全反映中国的整体经济的扭曲状态.

产业分布

大多数中国财富 500 公司在石油经营, 金融, 电力, 铁和钢, 汽车, 煤炭, 和有色金属扇区. 多年来, 这个行业的分布未发生重大变化, 而这些行业要么有垄断地位, 或遭受产能过剩或巨额亏损.

目前, 中国正在努力降低生产和消除僵尸公司 - 那些通过贷款维持生命非生产性国有企业. 换一种说法, 这些财富 500 公司无疑代表着中国经济的缺点,而不是它的竞争力.

一行人走过北京人民中国银行07月. 22, 2007. (德英冠/法新社/盖蒂图片社)

银行领跑

今年, 苹果公司公布利润 $53.4 十亿, 超越中国工商银行成为全球最赚钱的公司. 第2到第5最赚钱的财富 500 公司是中国四大银行. 有 10 今年名单上的中国的银行. 拥有超过 $180 十亿的利润, 他们占 55 在利润方面所有的中国公司名单上的百分比.

无论我们正在寻找中国的超过 3,000 在证券交易所上市的公司或在财富的那些 500 名单, 银行收入超过了实体经济更. 从财富 500 名单我们可以看到,实体经济工程,为银行业.

一名工人在武汉炼油厂中国石化骑自行车, 在中国的湖北省五月城市 10, 2011. (STR / AFP / Getty图像)

只有很少的服务和技术公司

这些年来, 美国的数量, 日本, 甚至韩国企业在财富 500 名单一直在下降. 在 2016, 只要 54 日本企业也榜上有名, 中国企业不到一半的数量.

然而, 在行业分布方面, 来自这些国家的公司在零售蔓延, 电子产品, 互联网, 国家的最先进的制造, 医, 等领域,代表了世界未来经济发展. 中国企业, 另一方面, 大多是涉及石油, 功率, 电信, 钢, 等垄断或准垄断企业, 虽然电子商务巨头京东, 家电巨头美的, 与食品巨头万州国际也在名单上.

参观者在观看建筑师的公寓楼的模型 2007 西安秋季房地产展示交易会在陕西省西安10月. 26, 2007. (中国照片/盖蒂图片社)

许多房地产公司

最后, 中国对财富的最房地产公司 500 名单, 包括三大地产巨头, 万科, 万达, and Hengda. 以往, 绿地控股集团亦在名单上.

据不完全统计, 多于 13 与房地产相关的公司也都在名单上, 包括中国在内的资源, 中国中信银行, 粮集团, PowerChina, 中国五矿, 中国建筑工程, 中国航空工业集团公司, 海南航空, CK记, 和天津商品 & 材料集团. 这意味着它们之间的 110 中国企业, 至少 17 都涉及到房地产行业. 它反映了中国经济对房地产的依赖.

面临的挑战

想必, 更多的财富 500 公司的国家夸耀, 较高的整体经济实力. 但是考虑产业布局和盈利考虑在内时,, 在U.S之间的间隙. 和中国不小,因为它从出现财富 500 名单. 这是一个巨大的尴尬为中国有企业是垄断行业名单上, 行业产能过剩或经济损失的困扰, 和房地产企业. 与此同时, 很少有中国科技公司. 这表明,中国还有很长的和具有挑战性的前进道路的基础上创新和竞争力实现经济转型前.

任何列表的意义将改变中国与包括. 要获得财富 500 名单已成为中国企业的一个目标, 而地方政府也追求它自己的业绩记录着想. 它顺利,伴随着中国追求国内生产总值的大小,并在过去的速度和整体发展规模 30 年份.

但显然, 使得它到财富 500 名单并不代表一切. 一方面, 它并不代表先进生产力. 该 500 企业其实都是 500 规模最大的企业. 随着中国依靠国家, 它不是什么大不了的事有大型企业. 有人认为,通过企业兼并重组, 中国可以采取顶 200 在财富的地方 500 如果它想列表.

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A man rides a bicycle at an abandoned industrial area of Houjie town in Dongguan on Jan. 27, 2016. (Lam Yik Fei/Getty Images)A man rides a bicycle at an abandoned industrial area of Houjie town in Dongguan on Jan. 27, 2016. (Lam Yik Fei/Getty Images)

后 35 多年的经济快速增长, China’s economy has significantly decelerated in the past couple of years. What used to be double-digit growth has dropped to between 6 至 7 百分, a nearly 50 percent reduction. Many people point to China’s weak internal consumption. 然而, the real problem is the rigid wealth distribution system.

Ailing Consumption

投资, 消费, and exports have long been the troika of China’s economic growth. 然而, despite the fact that consumption has somewhat increased in the past couple of years, investment and exports have accounted for larger shares during the past twenty plus years before 2011, while consumption was relatively weak. Especially in the 10 years after 2000, consumption as a share of GDP, continued to decline from 46 %的 2000 至 34 %的 2010.

Chinese construction workers at work in Central Beijing on Jan. 20, 2015. (凯文Frayer /盖蒂图片社)

China is the world’s second largest economy after the United States. 然而, it has over a billion more people than the United States, and all Chinese are thought of as newly rich. 但实际上, that’s not the case. According to a World Bank survey, 在 2012 the per capita consumption in the United States was $30,903, while in China it was only $1,221. The world’s per capita consumption, excluding China, is about $5,400. That makes China’s per capita consumption less than a quarter of the world’s consumption and only 4 percent that of the United States.

The massive building boom that has transformed China’s major cities gives one the false impression that everyone in China is wealthy and that Chinese are rich enough to buy up the United States several times over. But if you go to the countryside, you will see farmers who are not even able to buy a can of soda.

With a population of 1.4 十亿, China’s consumption still depends on government investment. This shows that there are serious, inherent problems in the economic structure. 例如, the average square meter home price in Beijing costs 50,000 yuan ($7,500 ). Who can afford this kind of real estate? Less than 1 percent of China’s total population can. 换一种说法, Beijing’s real estate prices are of no consequence or benefit to 99 percent of the Chinese people, even if the price were to rise to a million yuan per square meter.

China’s mainstream population is not rich, although there are quite a lot of new-rich who have made a fortune over the past two decades. 事实上, China has the most wealthy people in Asia. But compared with China’s total population, they are a very tiny percentage, and they cannot be expected to raise China’s internal consumption by very much.

Wealth Distribution

For more than 90 percent of Chinese people, low consumption is a problem related to lack of income, lack of wealth, 土地, and capital. In order for the Chinese economy to improve, we must resolve the polarization of wealth and design a system that supports prosperity for the majority of citizens.

For a long time now, a detrimental policy has persisted in China’s economic planning. 亦即, the focus has been to benefit the interests of a small number of people. 因此, the real issue facing the Chinese economy is its outdated and rigid wealth distribution system that is incapable of fairly adjusting the distribution of the county’s resources. Since only a few people can benefit, it accelerates social inequality, with the rich becoming richer and the poor becoming poorer.

A scavenger picks up useful construction waste from a garbage dump in Hefei, Anhui Province on Dec. 9, 2012. (STR / AFP / Getty图像)

China’s social distribution system is defunct not just in regard to income, but also regarding bank credit and opportunities. To obtain some degree of financial wealth, it is not enough to tell people to work hard. One also needs knowledge, 首都, political and business relationships, and other opportunities. 例如, a small trader needs liquidity to open a shop or expand his business. Whether he can get capital is crucial to him. Lacking capital, he may not achieve his lifetime dream of opening up a shop merely through working hard.

Availability of bank loans are part of the system of social capital distribution. Access to knowledge is about equal education for all. Opportunities to accumulate wealth is about equality and justice. How a society distributes these resources to all its members is not just a question of income distribution, but an issue of fair competition.

If China’s wealth distribution system does not change, the majority of the Chinese people will remain shut off from opportunities and resources and be unable to accumulate any meaningful wealth. 因此, the prospects for China’s economic development lie in the reform of wealth distribution.

范迪安是北京大学和中山大学大学的独立经济学家和兼职教授. 他获得了博士学位. 在加州大学, 伯克利, 由北京大学厉以宁和诺贝尔文学奖得主乔治·阿克洛夫亚瑟监督. 范一直是高级管理人员和顾问各大银行, 金融公司, 和大型企业. This is an abridged translation of an article posted on July 12, 2016 to his public WeChat account.

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一个人读报纸报道,中国央行宣布将贬值对中国八月的严格控制货币. 11, 2015 按照行业低迷, 触发人民币的最大单日跌幅在十年. (美联社照片/王子安)一个人读报纸报道,中国央行宣布将贬值对中国八月的严格控制货币. 11, 2015 按照行业低迷, 触发人民币的最大单日跌幅在十年. (美联社照片/王子安)

负债越多越快乐, 俗话说, 至少直到一方停止和启动宿醉. 这是真实的 债务形势 在中国境内, 以及为国际贷款来中国.

根据本 国际清算银行 (TO), 总的跨境银行借贷,以减少中国 $63 以十亿 $698 十亿在第一季度末 2016. 一年下来, 这一措施是向下 27 百分.

“自从创下其历史最高水平,在九月底 2014, 跨境银行信贷中国已经收缩了累积 $367 十亿 (-33%的), 与银行间和部门间的活动领跌,”国际清算银行写在最近的报告.

优秀的跨境银行信贷的总存量为 $27.5 万亿三月底 2016.

这是重要的,因为钱是不会回来了. 一旦贷款或债务还清, 它消失,不能用于燃料其他金融或经济交易. 这就是为什么世界上许多经济体都在衰退边缘徘徊,只有银行贷款给西方政府平衡了新兴市场信用下降的部分原因.

银行贷款减少的部分 正在流出中国的资本 由千亿, $676 在十亿 2015 单独.

金融国际学院 (IIF)

金融国际学院 (IIF)

香港的银行通过降低其在中国曝光 4.5 从个百分点。 32.8 在年底的资产的百分比 2014 至 27.3 在百分之的端部 2015, 根据评级机构惠誉, 在十年来首次下降.

国际银行警惕 放缓的中国经济 并在企业违约上升.

根据评级机构标准普尔 (小号&P), 中国的信贷质量正在“恶化比2009年以来任何时候更加迅速,”它在最近的一份报告指出. 小号&P下调三家公司每家公司在上半年升级 2016.

中国企业将“受到越来越多的压力之下的经济增长放缓, 产能过剩卷曲的盈利能力和现金流, 和升高的胃口扩张减弱杠杆“。

不同国家在中美国际银行索赔. 万亿美元 (剩下) 和中美. 十亿美元 (对) (国际清算银行 (TO))

不同国家在中美国际银行索赔. 万亿美元 (剩下) 和中美. 十亿美元 (对) (国际清算银行 (TO))

和国际银行不想等待发生. 他们也不希望等待中国货币的大幅贬值.

“一个 人民币的大幅贬值, 这将是后果,如果 [外币] 储量将不得不用来保护那些有外币债务系统性重要机构. 这将是一个不作为的后果, 经济衰退和, 在最坏的情况下, 金融危机. 再次, 东西是生存; 世界不是结束, 但非常昂贵和政治不稳定,“ 称,花旗集团首席经济学家威勒姆·布特.

休·亨德利, 主要的对冲基金Eclectica较为悲观:

“明天我们醒来,中国已经贬值 20 百分, 世界已经结束. 这个世界已经结束. 欧元分手. 一切撞墙. 有没有在该方案中没有欧元. 美国. 经济, 我的意思是一切撞墙,”他在今年早些时候告诉RealVisionTV.

按照瓦伦丁在Twitter: @vxschmid

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