The Chinese regime launched a new spy satellite on March 29 (03:17 UTC), claiming it will be used for civilian purposes. According to NASA SpaceFlight, the Ziyuan-3 is a high-resolution remote sensing satellite.
To understand the nature of this satellite launch, we need to look back at earlier launches of China’s Ziyuan satellites.
When it launched its Ziyuan-2 satellite on Sept. 1, 2001, Bill Gertz of The Washington Times reported that the Chinese regime was disguising it as a civilian earth monitoring system. In actuality, he reported, it was a reconnaissance satellite which was used to target U.S. forces operating in the region.
Các 2001 satellite was also launched from the Taiyuan Satellite Launching Center in Shanxi Province, and Chinese authorities made the same claims about its use as they are now with the current satellite. Chinese authorities said in 2001, according to Gertz, that its uses would include “territorial surveying, city planning, crop yield assessment, disaster monitoring and space science experimentation.”
An unnamed official said otherwise, Tuy vậy. Gertz reported, “An official familiar with intelligence reports on the launch said it is ‘a photoreconnaissance satellite used exclusively for military purposes.’” The official added, “Contrary to officially announced civilian missions, this spacecraft is actually a high-resolution imagery satellite that is producing images of military targets in the areas surrounding China.”
Read MoreChina’s Secret Space Weapons Have the Pentagon Worried
NASA SpaceFlight reported that the ZiYuan-1 program is focused on Earth resources, and “appears to have two distinct military and civil branches.” Its ZiYuan-2 program “is likely used for aerial surveillance operated by the People’s Liberation Army.” The new ZiYuan-3 program, it states, is for stereo mapping and “will be operated by the State Bureau of Surveying and Mapping.”
The line the Chinese regime is using for the new ZiYuan-3 program is almost the same as it used for the ZiYuan-2 satellites that Gertz exposed. The Indian Express reported the satellite is for “land resource surveys, natural disaster prevention, agricultural development, water resources management and urban planning, among other tasks.”

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A Chinese state-run news outlets, Global Times, published a response on May 29 to rumors that China would begin sending nuclear-armed submarines for patrols in the Pacific Ocean. While it notes the Chinese Communist Party (ĐCSTQ) has made no official announcements on the patrols, it states that it’s time for the People Liberation Army to send “nuclear submarines into the depth of the Pacific Ocean for regular patrols.”
The report argues that the CCP has a “no first use” policy on nuclear weapons, and because of this, its nuclear ambitions are benign. The problem is that China’s “no first use” policy is little more than a widely-parroted lie.
“With regard to ‘no first use,’ a careful look at the Chinese wording of China’s ‘no first use’ policy reveals that it commits them to nothing,” stated Mark Schneider, a senior analyst with the National Institute for Public Policy, during a congressional hearing in March 2012.
While the CCP’s policy suggests it would not use nuclear weapons unless another country used them first, its actual policy is that it could use nuclear weapons to counter regular military attacks as well.
Schneider noted a report from Kyodo News Agency, which obtained classified Chinese military documents stating China “will adjust the nuclear threat policy if a nuclear missile-possessing country carries out a series of air strikes against key strategic targets in our country with absolutely superior conventional weapons …”
Read MoreBeware the ‘Little White Rabbit’ of China’s Military
He also notes that in 2000, the CCP “adopted a nuclear doctrine which allowed for ‘a preemptive strike strategy,’” which allows it to use “its tactical nuclear weapons in regional wars if necessary.”
The use of pre-emptive strikes is still a key element in Chinese military writings, and as Michael Pillsbury notes in his book, “The Hundred-Year Marathon,” this concept is at the heart of its “Assassin’s Mace” strategy, which the CCP has designed to defeat technologically superior opponents such as the United States. The strategy includes the use of high altitude EMP (HEMP) attacks, which would leverage the EMP field generated by nuclear weapons to destroy communication and control systems of a targeted country.

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This news summary was originally dispatched as part of Epoch Times China email newsletters. Subscribe to the newsletters by filling your email in the “China D-briefbox under this article, or sign up here.
One of the most important developments in recent history for China’s military took place last month, and it was easy to miss.
The Chinese Communist Party (ĐCSTQ) ordered its military to abandon its business ventures over the next three years. The order applies to the People’s Liberation Army and the People’s Armed Police.
Those who follow Epoch Times reporting know the implications of this run deep. As my colleague Matthew Robertson pointed out, this will notably close the military-run hospitals which carry out the CCP’s forced organ transplants of prisoners of consciencemost markedly Falun Gong practitioners.
Robertson profiled the operations of one of these hospitals, Tianjin First Central, in an investigative piece in February, and noted “Epoch Times found sufficient evidence to throw into great doubt, if not demolish entirely, the official narrative of organ sourcing in China. This is simply due to the number of transplants: they are far too high.
But the implications of the new order for the Chinese military run deeper still, as the order will very likely also impact the Chinese military’s use of cyberattacks for financial gain.
I’m not talking about the state-sanctioned cyberattacks, but instead the cyberattacks military commanders run to feed business ventures they have ties to, and the cyberattacks individual military hackers carry out to stuff their own pockets.
I mapped out China’s military-industrial complex in a September 2015 investigative report, and noted that until recently the Chinese military was expected to find external ventures to fund its operations.
I also detailed in March the DarkNet marketplaces that Chinese military hackers run to make money on the side. The hackers have been carrying out the state-run cyberattacks on behalf of the Chinese regime, but have also been stealing additional information they can sell personally.
Under the new orders, it’s likely these external ventures will gradually lessen, and we could see a significant drop in Chinese cyberattacks.
Tất nhiên, this doesn’t mean the state-sponsored cyberattacks will stop. It just means the military-led cyberattacks the Chinese regime doesn’t have a direct hand in could be coming to an end.
This process has actually been underway for some time. In September 2015, the leader of the Chinese Communist Party, Tập Cận Bình, announced he would cut 300,000 troops from the Chinese military. This was accompanied by a planned restructuring of the Chinese military.
I reported in November 2015 that there was more to this restructuring than meets the eye. A proposal for the new structure shows that it would move the military units that carry out the cyberattacks out from under strict military control, and put them under joint command between the Central Military Commission and the State Council.
Nói cách khác, the restructuring would give the “governmentside of the Chinese regimethe state councilmore oversight over the types of cyberoperations being carried out by the military.
Read MoreAgreement on Cyberattacks Will Not Stop China’s Economic Theft
Ngày 16, the Chinese regime also deployed “anti-graftsquads to different theater commands and “key military departments,” according to the state-run Global Times. Under the oversight of these 10 anti-graft squads, it states, these targeted commands and departments will “for the first time be accountable to top military authorities.
This won’t all happen overnight, Tuy vậy. The state-run China Daily reported on May 10 that the People’s Liberation Army and People’s Armed Police have started by selecting 17 units to close their commercial activities.
With plans to complete this process within three years, it notes the 17 units are “tasked with exploring effective ways to shut down businesses.

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Chinese telecommunications company Huawei recently unveiled its new P9 smartphone, and as a recent Wired headline states, “Huawei just copied the iPhonedown to the last screw.
Incidents like this aren’t anything new when it comes to Chinese tech companies. Epoch Times noted back in 2014 that Chinese company Xiaomi had built its entire brand around copying Apple, right down to its CEO dressing like Steve Jobs during product events.
The recent development does, Tuy vậy, highlight an important issue.
Just a few months ago, thuộc Hoa Kỳ. leaders were adamant about stopping the Chinese regime’s use of cyberattacks to steal information from U.S. các công ty. This led to the agreement, announced by President Barack Obama and Chinese leader Xi Jinping, Tháng Bảy. 25, 2015, to end the use of cyberattacks for economic theft.
Obama stated, at the time, “We’ve agreed that neither the U.S. or the Chinese government will conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, including trade secrets or other confidential business information for commercial advantage.
There is mixed reporting on how effective the agreement was. A “60 Minutessegment on Jan. 17 noted that the day after the announcement, Chinese cyberattacks on U.S. businesses continued as usual. Cybersecurity company FireEye claimed the agreement did reduce the number of Chinese cyberattacks on U.S. các công ty, but its claims are also contested by other cyber researchers.
As I mentioned in an article around that time, Tuy vậy, the key problem with the cyber agreement is that it only addressed cyberattacks used for economic theft, and it only addressed economic theft conducted through cyber.
Nói cách khác, the agreement does nothing to stop cyberattacks used for intelligence gathering. This means the Chinese cyberattacks on the Office of Personnel Management, which stole 21.5 million records on current and former U.S. federal employees, falls outside the program.
And just as importantly, the agreement does nothing to stop Chinese economic theft using methods other than cyberespionage.
That last part is important. The part that’s often overlooked in China’s use of cyberattacks for economic theft, is that cyber is merely one of many tools the Chinese regime uses for theft of information, and all its tools are in turn just extensions of a system being directed by Chinese policy.
The Chinese regime still has a large focus on using conventional spies to steal information. Over the course of just three weeks in April, there were four cases of alleged Chinese spies targeting the United States.
Even this month, there has already been one case of an individual conducting what resembles espionage on behalf of the Chinese regime. A former U.S. Army contractor was sentenced to six months in home confinement for lying on his security clearance form by concealing that he formerly served in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. The individual had also violated security protocols by connecting a USB drive to a computer on the Army network, then trying to cover his tracks.
HƠN:Canada Says Huawei Employees May Be Spies, Rejects Immigration Applications
The fact is, the Chinese Communist Party has a vast system for stealing information from the United States and from U.S. businesses.
Its other methods include its use of vast networks of student spies, its use of academic research partnerships, its use of front organizations including Chinese hometown associations, its use of business partnerships around research, and its use of inviting foreign experts on key topics to visit China and either present or cooperate on research around their expertise.
Sau đó, there are Chinese “grey markets,” where Chinese factories that manufacture foreign goods simply do additional production runs, so they can make and sell the products themselves.
Stopping the cyberattacks won’t stop the problem. Cyber certainly makes it easier for the Chinese regime to steal products and designs, but again, they have plenty of other tools at their disposal.
Think of cyber as just one head of a hydra. You can cut off the head, but two heads will grow back in its place. With the Chinese regime, if cyber is removed from the equation of economic theft, it will simply find other, more effective means.
Yet, just like the mythical hydra, the way to stop this system is to stop swinging at the appendages, and go straight for the heartand for the Chinese regime, the heart of these programs are its internal policies and facilities for stealing and copying foreign technology.
HƠN:Faced With Barrage of Chinese Spies, US Expands Rules for National Security Cases
Its policies for economic theft include Project 863, the Torch Program, các 973 Program, và 211 Program. It also has a vast system of centers designed to reverse-engineer stolen technology, known as China’s National Technology Transfer Centers or National Demonstration Organizations.
With recent U.S. efforts to stop the Chinese regime’s use of economic theft, the question shouldn’t be whether the cyberattacks stopped. The questions should be whether the Chinese regime ended its policies that guide economic theft, and whether it closed its facilities dedicated to copying stolen technology. The answer so far to both of these questions is a simple “no.

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The Chinese regime scrambled fighter jets on May 10 to chase a U.S. Navy ship in a region of the south China Sea about 500 miles south of the Chinese mainland.
The United States is continuing its “freedom of navigationexercises in the region, which several different countries claim parts of, and which China claims in its entirety.
The USS William P. Lawrence, a guided missile destroyer, passed within 12-nautical miles of the Fiery Cross Reef, which is in the Spratly Island chain. According to Reuters, the Chinese regime responded by scrambling two fighter jets and three warships, which shadowed the U.S. ship and told it to leave.
China converted the reef into an artificial island in a highly controversial move in 2014, and satellite imagery in Sept. 2015 showed the Chinese regime had started building advanced military facilities on the man-made island, including sophisticated radar.
According to The Diplomat, the Chinese regime had also constructed a runway on the artificial island close to 10,000 feet long. On Jan. 2, it conducted its first landing on the newly-built airstrip.
This isn’t the first time the Chinese regime has scrambled jets to chase foreign ships or aircraft in the contested region. Trong 2013, soon after China created a largely unrecognized air defense zone in the disputed East China Sea, it began scrambling jets to chase U.S. and Japanese planes passing through the region.
HƠN:Faced With Barrage of Chinese Spies, US Expands Rules for National Security Cases
This may, Tuy vậy, be the first time the Chinese regime has scrambled jets to chase foreign ships in a region this far south of the Chinese mainland.
The Chinese regime only recently began deploying jets in the South China Sea. Trong tháng Hai, it began deploying jets on Woody Island, part of the Paracel Island chain closer to Vietnam and Hainan.
The jets it used in the recent incursion, Tuy vậy, were likely the two J-11 fighter jets it deployed in early April to Woody Island.

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The Chinese regime went ahead with tests of its newest ballistic missile on April 12, which can allegedly carry up to 10 nuclear warheads to any part of the United States.
It conducted the tests while also expressing discord over an upcoming decision from an international arbitration court about China’s claims to the South China Sea. The case, brought to court by the Philippines, could discredit China’s claims to the region.
Unnamed Pentagon officials revealed details on the missile test to the Washington Free Beacon. They allegedly monitored the flights of two missiles, which appeared on military satellites and regional sensors.
The officials did not detail the location of the test, but the Free Beacon notes in the April 19 article that previous tests were carried out from the Wuzhai Missile and Space Test Center in central China.
It also notes the tests came just three days before Defense Secretary Ash Carter visited a U.S. aircraft carrier in the South China Sea, and around the same time that a high-ranking Chinese general “made an unusual visit to a disputed South China Sea island.
According to Dr. Bernard D. Cole, who teaches Sino-American Relations and Maritime Strategy at the National War College, the test was likely planned long in advance
“The DF-41 has been in development for at least 15 năm, probably longer, so this is just the end of a very long development cycle,” he said in a phone interview.
The Free Beacon also noted that Kanwa Asian Defense reported last month that China’s new intercontinental ballistic missile was in its final testing phase, and they were expected to deply it near Xinyang in Henan province, ở miền trung Trung Quốc.
Cole said that China having a nuclear weapon that can strike the United States may not have a significant impact on how the United States deals with China, but it could affect the behavior of the Chinese regime.
“I don’t know that it’s going to make the U.S. approach different, if at all, but it will give China more confidence as they deal with issues,” Cole said.
ông nói thêm, “It will build a confidence in their diplomacy and their miltiary status.
Another factor is that the Chinese regime has been mulling over plans to change its policy on nuclear weapons from “survivabilityto a hair-trigger status that has its missiles ready to launch at any moment.
The Union of Concerned Scientists noted China’s potential shift in policy in a Feb. 16 bài báo cáo. It said China may be moving “toward a policy of launch-on-warning and hair-trigger alert,” and noted the United States also uses a hair-trigger alert.
“Such a change would dramatically increase the risk of a nuclear exchange or accidenta dangerous shift that the United States could help avert,” it stated.
HƠN:Second Chinese Spy Case In a Week: Tried Exporting Materials for China Missile Program
According to Cole, the “worse case situationwith China’s new missiles and its alleged policy changes woudl be if policies of mutually-assured destruction were to emerge between China and the United States, similar to what existed between the United State and the Soviets during the Cold War.
He said, Tuy vậy, that there seems to be no indication that things are moving in that direction, yet noted “it’s possible.
With the latest test in particular, Cole said, “it’s an important development, but I don’t think it’s a crucial one.

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As the Chinese National People’s Congress met in Beijing this week, one announcement was the planned defense budget for 2016. Contrary to some rumors, China’s defense budget will rise by “only” 7.6 percent in 2016, only the second time in 20 years that the growth has been in single digits. At 954 billion renminbi, or approximately $147 tỷ, China’s defense budget is second only to that of the United States.
The Chinese defense budget figure has long been a source of controversy, as it is believed to understate actual Chinese defense spending. Part of this is likely due to different accounting methods, as well as a tendency to limit transparency.
Tuy nhiên, it is clear that China is going to continue to allocate substantial resources to its defense modernization efforts, even as the Chinese economy shows signs of slowing.
The Chinese defense budget announcement comes on the heels of announcements of three major reform pathways.
HƠN:China’s Military Reform: Politics by Another NameUS Needs to Form an Asian Alliance to Stop Chinese Hegemony, Says Top Expert
Vào tháng Mười Hai, the Chinese announced the establishment of three new services: a separate ground forces command; the elevation of the Second Artillery to the status of a service; and the creation of a separate service to control China’s space, electronic warfare, and computer network attack forces. Subsequently, the Central Military Commission was reorganized from four General Departments to 15 departments, commissions, and offices.
cuối cùng, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has announced a transition from seven military regions to five theater or war zone joint commands. Coupled with the announcement of a 300,000-man cut in the size of the People’s Liberation Army made in September 2015, the PLA is clearly undergoing a massive, fundamental overhaul.
It is not clear why the Chinese defense budget increase was scaled back, although some analysts think it may reflect China’s slowing economy. It is worth noting, Tuy vậy, that the increase in the People’s Liberation Army budget is still substantially higher than the growth of any Western military.
HƠN:China’s Economy Is Just ‘One KilometerAway From a CliffChina Continues Vast Spending on Domestic Security
It also remains to be seen how the growth in the Chinese external security budget (i.e., for the PLA) compares with that for internal security, including the People’s Armed Police (PAP) and provincial-level public security forces. For the past several years, the internal security budget has grown more quickly than the defense budget, to the point where overall spending on internal security may outpace that for external defense.
Dean Cheng is a senior research fellow in The Heritage Foundation’s Asian Studies Center. Copyright The Daily Signal. This article was originally published on The Daily Signal.

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This news analysis was originally dispatched as part of Epoch Times China email newsletters. Subscribe to the newsletters by filling your email in the “China D-briefbox under this article.
All the saber rattling in the world won’t do a thing if China is able to successfully implement its anti-access strategy in the South China Sea. China’s deployment of the strategy is likely nearing completion.
Defense analysts have warned that China is working on a strategy to lock the United States out of the South and East China Sea with what they call anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) systems and capabilities.
This would give China control of the Asia-Pacific region, và, trong so nhung cai khac, make it difficult for the United States to intervene if the Chinese Communist Party (ĐCSTQ) were to invade Taiwan.
Dean Cheng, a leading expert on the Chinese military, warned in a July 2014 report for The Heritage Foundation that the Chinese military was “comprehensively modernizingforces, and incorporating A2/AD systems ranging from anti-ship missiles to political warfare methods, including legal, public opinion, and psychological warfare.
The world has now watched as China deployed these weapons and capabilities, over the last couple years.
China has recently deployed jets, radar, and anti-air missiles on islands in the South China Sea. It may also be building a new helicopter base for anti-submarine warfare, along with refueling stops scattered through the region. Chinese defense analysts are now calling for Chinese ships to ram and fire warning shots at U.S. ships passing through the region. Others are calling for the CCP to deploy anti-ship missiles and other advanced weapons.
When the CCP’s weapons and strategies used in the South China Sea are viewed as a whole, it now has systems to attack targets in the air, sea, and undersea. And it has accompanied this with a near constant barrage of propaganda and legal claims meant to change global perceptions on its actions.
HƠN:TRUNG QUỐC AN: Clash Over South China Sea Is Reaching Boiling PointChina Starts Building Military Base in North Africa
While the situation has appeared chaotic, the CCP’s strategy has actually moved along steadily.
The CCP announced in July 2015 that it was completing operations to build islands in the South China Sea. Epoch Times reported accurately that the CCP was merely moving to “phase 2in its operations.
“It means they’re moving onto phase 2, which means the construction of facilities and capabilities on these islands,” said Mira Rapp-Hooper, director of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at the Center for Strategic & Nghiên cứu quốc tế, at the time.
The CCP is now well into that second phase, and when that’s complete, phase 3 will likely follow.
And that third phase is likely what defense experts have been warning about for years: a phase where the CCP acts on its threats, and starts attacking foreign military ships and jets passing through the region.
This next phase may not be far off. On Feb. 28, South China Morning Post reported, “China’s military is prepared ‘to defend sovereigntyin the South China Sea.
It quoted People’s Liberation Army General Wang Jiaocheng saying “No country will be allowed to use any excuse or action to threaten China’s sovereignty and safety,” and added, “the foremost mission is to safeguard rights and interests in the South China Sea.
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From here, whether the CCP succeeds in its plan hinges on whether or not the United States chooses to back downand it doesn’t appear the U.S. military plans on doing that anytime soon.
Commander of U.S. Pacific Command, Adm. Harry Harris, recently said the CCP is “changing the operational landscape in the South China Sea,” and said the United States will continue its patrols of the region as it always has, regardless of threats or claims from the CCP.
“Short of war, I’m aware of the threat. I’ll pay attention to the threat,” ông nói. “But that is not going to prevent us from flying, sailing or operating wherever international law allows.

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An insider in China has revealed to the Epoch Times that he helped build a database that is now being used to handle Americanspersonal information stolen in cyberattacks.
The FBI revealed on June 4, 2015, that a cyberattack, allegedly from China, stole personal information on close to 21.5 million U.S. federal employees after breaking into the computer files of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). Subsequent Chinese cyberattacks have also targeted personal data on Americans, including the February 2015 breach of Anthem that stole close to 80 million records.
Speculation began soon after on how the Chinese regime could use the data. A July 2015 report from the Congressional Research Service states “experts in and out of governmentsuspect the Chinese regime may be building a database on federal employees it could use for espionage.
With a database like thisthe Chinese regime can have a systematic roadmap of Americans and their connections, and information it can use to blackmail government employees, recruit insiders as spies, and monitor people who speak out against its policies.
FBI Director James Comey said in a Sept. 10, 2015, hearing on cybersecurity, “There is a significant counterintelligence threat that’s associatedwith a nationstate getting hold of the data.
According to the insider, Đảng Cộng sản Trung Quốc (ĐCSTQ) has built the database needed to make use of the massive trove of stolen data. He said that to create the spy database, the CCP brought in a small group of independent software developers from the United States, who worked alongside Chinese security branches to implement the system.
The source requested to have his name withheld, in fear of reprisal from the CCP. Other sources confirmed this man’s identity, and said that he would have access to the kind of information he gave the Epoch Times. Trong quá khứ, he has provided the Epoch Times with significant information about confidential matters in China that has proven accurate.
(Minh họa bởi Jens Almroth / The Epoch Times)
The new system is part of a broader shift in the Chinese regime’s efforts in espionage and social control. With the database, the CCP is now keeping tabs on foreigners in much the same way it has kept tabs on its own citizens, their connections, and their political thoughts.
Chinese spy agencies finished building the system around July 2013. Tháng Ba 2014, Chinese hackers originally tried, and failed, to breach OPM.
The source said one of the leading organizations involved in the project was the 61 Research Institute, which is one of four known research institutes under the Third Department of the General Staff Departmentthe branch of the People’s Liberation Army in charge of its military hackers.
The Epoch Times exposed in a previous investigation that the 61 Research Institute is one of the leading organizations behind the CCP’s state-run cyberattacks.
The organization is led by Wang Jianxin, a son of Wang Zheng, who helped establish the CCP’s signals intelligence operations under Mao Zedong.
While the 61 Research Institute’s role in the project ties it to global cyberespionage, the source said many other Chinese domestic security branches were also involved in building the systemincluding various branches of the police and about six branches of the secret police.
The functions of the spy system, and the departments involved, suggest it will be used not only as a database on foreigners, but also as a system to better monitor Chinese people. The source noted that one of its functions will be to gather information on individuals from all available sources in China, and outside China, that can be used for criminal trials.
“Our intelligence sources corroborate this information,” said Casey Fleming, CEO of BLACKOPS Partners Corporation, which provides cybersecurity intelligence, strategy, and risk reduction to some of the largest companies in the world.
“Our ongoing intelligence gathering shows indication that this database has been in process at least over the last three yearscommanded at the highest levels of the Chinese government,” he said in a phone interview.
Big Data Espionage
According to the source, the software used for the database was originally a big data analytics program for smart city measurements, and the CCP altered it for its own uses.

Chinese hackers stole personal information on approxiamtely 21.5 million Americans from the computer files of the U.S. government’s Office of Personnel Management. (
What made the software attractive was its powerful functions for gathering information, and showing relationships between data. The source said it was also scalableenough to hold credentials on every Chinese citizen, and to display everything from their personal data, to data on their family members, relations, and personal background.

The spy database displays data in nodes, which can be displayed by themselves, in relation to other data or events.
The system is capable of ingesting and sorting large amounts of data. The source noted the spy database is even better at this than some open source programs designed for the purpose.
A security service using the system could conduct deep data mining on personal files in the system, to show how individuals relate to one another, even over set timeframes.
The system can also be used to collect data on individuals. The source said it can gather information on people from Chinese security offices, from its own internal database, and from sources abroad, outside the Chinese firewall.
According to the source, getting personal data on foreignersincluding Americansis fairly easy. He said it’s often not necessary for the Chinese regime to use cyberattacks to steal sensitive information.
He said U.S. banks, ví dụ, often hire many people from other countries, and many tech industries do the same. Many of these individuals can be given trusted positions within these companies, and he said it’s not uncommon for some of these individuals to take data out of the companies, and sell it.
It’s not difficult, ông nói, to create a fairly deep profile on a person using data stolen from just a handful of sources.
The Chinese spy system he helped build, ông nói, takes this information and organizes it in a form that departments of the Chinese regime can then usewhether it be for industrial espionage, or other purposes.
Fleming said that although the most visible Chinese cyberattacks feeding

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While news that China deployed anti-aircraft missiles in the South China Sea made headlines over the past week, the missiles are just part of a broader shift that will likely take the conflict to a new level.
The changes began on Jan. 30, when the USS Curtis Wilbur, a destroyer with the U.S. Navy, passed within 12 nautical miles of Triton Island in the Paracel Island chain in the South China Sea.
It was part of a “freedom of navigationmission, and was supported by Taiwan and Vietnam, which both lay claim to Triton Island. Trung Quốc, on the other hand, which also claims the island, was not happy.
State-run news sources within China began trumpeting news about U.S. aggression, and claims that the United States was trying to establish “hegemonyin the South China Sea.
I explained the irony of the Chinese narrative in a previous piecenoting that the situation is the opposite. China is literally trying to establish hegemony over the region, while the United States is trying to maintain standards of free transit through the waters which are critical to international trade.
Yet, regardless of intentions, the Chinese regime called for a heightened military response against the United States and its alliesand this may bring tensions in the South China Sea to a boiling point.
Satellite imagery from Feb. 14 showed that China deployed anti-air missile systems (surface-to-air missiles, or SAMs) on Woody Island in the Paracel Island chain.
The Chinese regime claimed the missiles had been there for years, but if this was true, the Chinese military had kept the missiles hidden. Satellite images show the missiles were brought out sometime between Feb. 3 and Feb. 14. Previous reports say China began weaponizing its man-made islands around May 2015.
While the missiles took center-stage in global reporting, Tuy vậy, there were several other developments of similar weight.
China may be building a new helicopter base for anti-submarine warfare (ASW), according to a report from USNI News, a news source of the U.S. Naval Institute. Defense analysts have previously noted that submarines would be a game-changes for the United States, if there were a war with China.
The new anti-submarine base “could signal a step-up in China’s ASW capabilities across the South China Sea,” states a report from Victor Robert Lee of The Diplomat.
“A network of helicopter bases and refueling stops scattered across the South China Sea, using no more than the bases China is already known to be building, would make almost any coordinate in the sea reachable,” Lee states.
People’s Daily, one of the main mouthpieces of the Chinese regime, then followed with a commentary saying China must “teach the US a lessonif the United States continues its freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea.
The commentary said Chinese forces should fire warning shots and ram U.S. ships.
Chinese news outlets are now reporting that the Chinese regime may deploy anti-ship missiles, and other weapons in the South China Sea.
Li Jie, senior researcher at the PLA Naval Military Studies ­Research Institute, told the South China Morning Post that China would deploy more advanced weapons if the United States “pushed too hard.
Facing the rise in tensions with China, the United States is now looking to expand a key naval protocol for safety of ships meeting at sea, called the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea.
The proposed changes would edit rules to cover non-military ships. It was outlined by Vice Admiral Joseph Aucoin, the commander of the Japan-based U.S. Seventh Fleet, according to The Diplomat.
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One of the key reasons for the considered changes, according to The Diplomat, is that the Chinese regime is deploying new, large coast guard ships “painted white rather than Navy grey.China has been using coast guard and fishing boats as part of its military strategy in the region.
Other nations are also upping their game to challenge China’s claims. The United States is urging Australia to begin its own freedom of navigation operations, Vietnam is building up its military, troops in the Philippines are preparing for the “worst-casescenario of a dispute with China, and Japan is considering starting its own naval patrols.
The question now is how hard is China willing to push back, and how will other nations undo China’s actions to build military structures in its push to control transit in the region.

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PEARL HARBOR, Hawaii—Mỹ. Pacific Fleet is shrinking even as the U.S. and its allies are facing challenges posed by China’s growing military power.
thuộc Hoa Kỳ. Navy officials say the more advanced ships of today make up for the decline in numbers. But the Navy has also had to lengthen deployments and postpone maintenance to maintain its presence with fewer ships.
Peter Jennings, an expert at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute think tank, said the issue in peacetime is whether there are enough American vessels to reassure friends and allies.
“I think this is emerging as a serious long-term problem,” ông nói.
The Pacific Fleet currently has 182 vessels, including combat ships like aircraft carriers as well as auxiliary and logistics vessels, said spokesman Cmdr. Clay Doss. That compares to 192 nearly two decades ago.
The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy has more than 300 surface ships, submarines, amphibious ships and patrol craft, according to the Pentagon’s Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy report released in August.
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This all comes as China has grown more aggressive in asserting claims to islands also claimed by U.S. allies, including the Philippines in the South China Sea and Japan in the East China Sea.
China sees the U.S. military presence in Asia as an attempt to contain it, said Denny Roy, a senior fellow at the East-West Center in Honolulu. Beijing sees itself as returning to its rightful and historical role as the pre-eminent cultural and political power in the region, ông nói.
Since December 2013, China has built what the U.S. estimates to be 3,000 acres of artificial islands in disputed areas of the South China Sea using sand dredged from the ocean floor.
China has said the islands are meant to help ships, fishermen and disaster relief.
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Questions about whether the Pacific Fleet has enough resources are more of a reflection of regional anxieties than the Navy’s actual capability, said its commander, Adm. Scott Swift.
“I’m very comfortable with the resources I have,” Swift said.
He pointed to the USS Benfold, a guided missile destroyer upgraded with new ballistic missile defenses, as well as three new stealth destroyers, the DDG-1000, in the pipeline, as examples.
One consequence of a smaller fleet has been more time at sea. Retired Adm. Zap Zlatoper, who commanded the Pacific Fleet in the 1990s, said deployments longer than six months made it harder for the Navy to retain sailors. Ships now deploy for an average of seven to nine months, though the Navy plans to lower this to seven.
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Ship conditions have also suffered. The USS Essex left an exercise with Australia early in 2011 and skipped another with Thailand the following year because it developed mechanical problems after delaying maintenance to stay at sea.
Bryan Clark, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, a Washington think tank, said these are signs the status quo is unsustainable.
In a November report, Clark outlined alternatives: build more ships, though this would require money Congress may not give the Navy, or deploy less, though the Pentagon has been reluctant to accept less of an overseas presence.
The other choices: keep more ships at overseas bases where they would be closer to where they operate or mix up how ships deploy. One example would be to send fewer escorts with an aircraft carrier.

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A major command structure reform is coming to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) by the end of 2015, unnamed sources told the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post. The reform, known to be in the works for the past several months, is intended to orient the PLA towards becoming a more professional force in the mold of Western militaries, while at the same time maintaining and consolidating the Communist Party’s central political control over it.
These institutional changes, made as Chinese leader Xi Jinping strengthens his personal authority, represent the latest round of the often-turbulent Party-Army dynamic.
The restructuring involves personnel changes, cuts to the force size, and highlights the important roles of the PLA’s air and naval forces, which have historically taken a back seat to the ground forces.
Two sources told the South China Morning Post that the seven “obsoletemilitary regions would be replaced by five regional commandsNorth, South, East, West, and a central combat zone, which one of the sources said would likely be located in Beijing.
“The head office of the central combat zone is likely to be in Beijing, because the capital is also China’s administrative and military nerve centre,” các nguồn tin cho biết.
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In a commentary piece published recently in a PLA journal, the existing seven-command system was criticized as outdated. It was said to be overly centralized and to pose a challenge to Party control. According to the new setup, the Central Military Commission, the agency by which the Communist Party controls the Chinese military, would wield more direct authority. New commissions and departments have already been created to this end, South China Morning Post said.
Historically, the Party and PLA have had a complicated, sometimes cut-throat relationship due to the former’s demand for political dominance. Founder of the communist state Mao Zedong, known for his saying that the “Party controls the gun,” purged the armed forces multiple times, including officers who had followed his earlier directives.
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Một lát sau, under former Party leader Jiang Zemin, the PLA and its staff engaged in massive corruption as generals such as Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong, who had personal allegiances to Jiang Zemin, abused their power. These and other officers have been purged en masse in the two years since Xi Jinping took power.
Xi’s reform, Tuy nhiên, is also likely to involve personal ties. Vào tháng Mười, sources told South China Morning Post that the leader’s ally Gen. Zhang Youxia was a likely candidate for vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission. Xi and Zhang’s fathers were fellow officers in the communist forces during the Chinese civil war that brought the Party to power in the 1940s.

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This news analysis was originally dispatched as part of Epoch Times China email newsletters. Subscribe to the newsletters by filling your email in the “China D-briefbox under this article.
Imagine for a moment how the world would react if the United States spent $2 billion to purchase 16 Eurofighter Typhoon fighter jets. It would likely draw immediate speculation that U.S. development of the F-35 and F-22 jets had somehow failed.
This speculation should also hold true for a very real arms purchase that happened on Nov. 19, when the Chinese regime announced its $2 billion purchase of 24 Russian Su-35 fighter jets, tại $83 million each.
On the surface, the purchase seems a bit odd. The Su-35 is a 4.5 generation fighter jet. The Chinese regime already has several 4.5 generation fighter jets it can build domestically (the JF-17, the JH-7, the J-10, and the J-11), and it’s currently developing two fifth-generation jets (the J-20 and the J-31).
The purchase should raise the question of why a country would purchase foreign jets, when it could allegedly build more powerful jets by itself.
The simple answer is that Chinese fighter jets have more problems than they’d like the world to think.
As a bit of background, the Chinese regime’s interests in the Su-35 aren’t new. Russia started negotiating in 2011 to sell the jets to China, and the negotiations were stalled for a while since the Chinese Communist Party (ĐCSTQ) wanted the jets to be built in Chinese factories.
I reported in 2013 that history is repeating itself with the CCP’s interests in the Su-35. It mirrors what happened with the Chinese programs to develop the J-10 fighter jet.
The CCP began developing the J-10 in the 1980s, put out a prototype in the 1990s, and then in 1992 it purchased 50 Su-27s from Russia. The CCP’s purchase of the Russian jets was viewed as a sign that the J-10 programs were failing.
Cho đến ngày nay, Russia remains the main supplier of China’s fighter jets and bombers, and many domestically-built Chinese planes still rely on Russian parts.
It wasn’t until 2006 that the CCP completed the J-10, and to this day, the jet relies on Russian partsincluding Russian engines.
The CCP’s development of jet engines has been a blunder of its own. It announced in 2010 that it would start building its own jet enginesusing the WS-10A, which was still a knock-off of a Russian engine. Just one year later, Tuy vậy, it went back to ordering Russian jet engines.
In this same light, the CCP’s purchase of the Su-35 jets could mean that it lacks faith in its own production of modern-generation fighter jets, including its J-20.
Behind the rhetoric, there are some serious problems in the CCP’s state-run jet companies. A manager at Shenyang Aircraft Corp. revealed some of these problems to Epoch Times in an interview last year, and exposed rampant corruption and faulty production methods.
The manager said four company executives were embezzling close to 100 triệu nhân dân tệ ($16 triệu) a year. The manager claimed that key components in the J-8 fighter jet were built by temporary workers from eight factoriesand noted these companies lacked training, certifications, and work authorization.
The manager also revealed there are hidden problems in the Chinese jets, which requires Shenyang Aircraft Corp. to have specialized repair teams on standby whenever the CCP’s air force operates its jets.
China Central Television (CCTV), one of the main mouthpieces of the CCP, aired some of these shortcomings in a recent video. It showed precision parts of the J-15 fighter jet being manually polished at Shenyang Aircraft Corp.
Chinese netizens were quick to poke fun at the broadcast, pointing out the components being hand polished are controlled at three micron precision, or about 0.0001 of an inch. One user wrote, “Nowadays advanced [computer numerical control] can completely achieve precision of two micron. The technician in the report would have to be a superman to be as precise as three micron.
Cũng thế, while most news outlets were quick to trump up the Chinese purchase of the Su-35 jets as a kind of power shift that could challenge the U.S. fighter jets, they won’t do much to change the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region.
The Su-35 is close to the capabilities of the Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet. The United States also has several 4.5 generation fighter jets, including the F-14 Tomcat, F-15 Eagle, and the F-16 Fighting Falcon.
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The planes also don’t give CCP too much of an edge over its neighbors. As far as 4.5 generation fighter jets go, India has the HAL Tejas, South Korea has the FA-50, and Japan has the F-2. India has also provided 12 of its FA-50s to the Philippines.
The other reality is that the Chinese regime’s development of fifth generation fighter jets is on the clock.
Ấn Độ, Hàn Quốc, Indonesia, and Japan are all developing fifth-generation fighter jets. India is developing the HAL Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft and the Sukhoi/HAL Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft. Japan is developing the Mitsubishi ATD-X. Indonesia and South Korea are co-developing the KF-X/IF-X.
All of these programs are expected to be completed by the early-to-mid 2020s. If the CCP’s fifth generation fighter jets stay on track, it expects its J-20 to be operational by 2018 and its J-31 by to be operational by 2020.

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tháng mười một 9, 2015

Rumor has it the Chinese regime will move its cyberwarfare units under a single command structure. Unnamed sources told Bloomberg in mid-October that Chinese cyber units from all departments would be moved under a centralized command under the Central Military Commission.
Changes were allegedly discussed during the Chinese Communist Party’s (ĐCSTQ) Fifth Plenum, attended by more than 350 top CCP officials, where they lay out the new five-year economic plan.
Bloomberg followed with some interesting analysis, but in my opinion, it missed the mark. First of all, the Chinese regime already has a command structure for its cyber departments, which on the surfaceand under proposed changesis headed by the Central Military Commission. Second, proposals for the new Chinese military structure give a much more complex picture of how its cyber units will be managed.
As things stand now, the CCP’s cyber units are broken into three tiers. The structure, which is already under the Central Military Commission, was detailed in the latest edition of The Science of Military Strategy, published by the top research institute of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). While the document was released in 2013, details on the cyber structure were only reported in the West in March this year.
At the top of the cyber structure are the specialized PLA military units assigned to attack and defend networks. Next are the specialists in civilian organizationsincluding the the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Public Securitythat are “authorized by the military to carry out network warfare operations.The third tier are groups outside the regime, which presumably include nationalistic hackers (often known as “Patriot Hackers”), that can be called on for cyber operations when needed.
The Central Military Commission is technically in charge of these units, but when it comes to actual power within the PLA, things aren’t that simple.
According to the surface structure, the Central Military Commission heads the General Staff Department, which in turn heads the hacker units under its Third Department. In an investigative report in September, Tuy vậy, Epoch Times revealed that the real power behind the PLA hackers is the 61 Research Department of the Third Department.
Các 61 Research Institute is led by Maj. Gen. Wang Jianxin, son of Wang Zheng who pioneered the CCP’s signals intelligence operations under Mao Zedong. Sources told Epoch Times that while Wang’s department is several tiers below the Central Military Commission, he’s an extremely powerful man.
This is where the new structure comes into play. It ties into plans to restructure the entire PLA, and cut 300,000 troops, announced by CCP leader Xi Jinping in early September.
Shortly after the announcement, South China Morning Postwhich has been growing increasingly close to the Chinese regimereleased an infographic showing a proposal for the new structure.
Under the current system, most of the military is controlled by the Central Military Commission, with some power shared with the State Council through its joint influence over the Ministry of National Defense.
With the new structure, Tuy vậy, a large chunk of military units would be placed under the Ministry of National Defensewhich means the State Council would have more of a hand in their operations.
The State Council is technically the government of China, but it’s still controlled by the CCP.
Trong khi đó, the unit in charge of the hackersthe General Staff Departmentwould be given command over three other departments: General Political Department, General Logistics Department, and the General Armaments Department.
In an odd knot, control of those same three departments will be shared under the Ministry of National Defense. And oddly, also under the Ministry of National Defense will be some departments with ties to cyberespionage. Among them are the regional defense and research departments, the National Defense University, the Academy of Military Science, and the National University of Defense Technology.
Nói cách khác, the military hackers would officially remain under the Central Military Commission, but departments tied to their operations would be jointly controlled by an office managed by both the Central Military Commission and the State Council.
Keep in mind, these are still just proposals. But it appears the changes aren’t meant to consolidate command of the CCP’s hackers. Thay thế, it looks like the changes are designed to reign in the hackers by giving the State Council some indirect sway over their actions. Several sources have told Epoch Times that the Chinese regime has trouble controlling finances tied to military hackers, and this has caused forms of corruption that the leadership wishes to stem.
The new system would give the State Councilthe highest executive agency in the Chinese state (though of course below the Politburo Standing Committee)—more oversight. This puts the infrastructure for economic theft under the Ministry of Defense, while giving more government oversight over the activities, thus depriving the PLA of some of its autonomy.

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A concept for a “Very Large Floating Structure” mobile sea base is shown in a Chinese promotional video, which was posted online by naval defense industry magazine, Navy Recognition. The mobile base project was recently unveiled at the National Defense Science and Technology Achievements exhibition in Beijing. (YouTube screenshot)A concept for a “Very Large Floating Structure” mobile sea base is shown in a Chinese promotional video, which was posted online by naval defense industry magazine, Navy Recognition. The mobile base project was recently unveiled at the National Defense Science and Technology Achievements exhibition in Beijing. (YouTube screenshot)

This news analysis was originally dispatched as part of Epoch Times’ China email newsletters. Subscribe to the newsletters by filling your email in the “China D-brief” box under this article.

An odd project was unveiled at a recent military exhibition in Beijing, showing what could be the Chinese regime’s solution to both its lack of aircraft carriers, and the controversies around its island building programs.

The project is a “Mobile Sea Base” concept, using the fitting name of “Very Large Floating Structures” (VLFS). According to an Aug. 9 report from naval defense industry magazine, Navy Recognition, the Chinese regime’s VLFS project was publicly revealed at the National Defense Science and Technology Achievements exhibition in Beijing.

I poked fun at this project in a previous report, but its implications are actually rather serious.

The Chinese Communist Party (ĐCSTQ) detailed its global naval ambitions in its May 26 military strategy white paper. It plans to discard “the traditional mentality that land outweighs sea,” according to the white paper, and will begin to “protect the security” of strategic sea lines of communications, as well as “overseas interests.”

“Strategic sea lines of communications” is a fancy way of saying global maritime trade routes, and includes the handful of shipping chokepoints around the world. As I detailed in a recent report, the CCP is hard at work—around all these strategic locations—signing deals that would give it access to, or control of, local ports.

If you were to take the United States as an example, it’s able to have a global military presence thanks to its aircraft carriers and its military relationships with countries around the world, which grant it port access and land bases.

The Chinese regime, on the other hand, has only one very old and rickety aircraft carrier, and while it’s negotiating port access with countries around the world, most of these deals are still around trade, and its warships are still largely unwelcome.

This is where the VLFS Mobile Sea Bases come into play. The CCP’s strategy to close gaps in naval power has so far taken the form of its man-made islands in the South China Sea. These give it stations where its ships can refuel and resupply, as well as airstrips to compensate for its lack of aircraft carriers.

Its use of man-made islands has barely been allowed in the South China Sea, mainly because the CCP has argued it has “historical” sovereignty over the region, and because (at least until recently) it faces very little military threat from the surrounding countries.

In a recent article, I explained that the CCP is likely gearing up for a maritime push into the Indian Ocean. đó, its island construction wouldn’t work, not only because neither of the above points would apply to the Indian Ocean, but also because it lacks the reefs and shallow waters that made the CCP’s island building possible in the South China Sea.

Yet, the VLFS Mobile Sea Bases would solve all these problems. Since the bases float, very much like aircraft carriers, they would largely be immune to the legal controversies around the CCP’s man-made islands. And also because they float, they would be usable in the deep waters of the Indian Ocean.

It’s important to note that the VLFS concept isn’t new. According to Naval Recognition, the United States seriously considered building similar structures when it started Operation Desert Shield in 1990. They were called “mobile offshore bases.”

The rationale for the United States, according to Naval Recognition, was that with the structures, the United States “could have a base anywhere in the world in as little as a month,” and the bases could go beyond the capabilities of aircraft carriers to accommodate even very large aircraft like the C-17 Globemaster III.

The Chinese regime is already showing off concepts for the bases. If they decide to build and deploy them in the Indian Ocean, the world will face a situation similar to what’s happening already with Chinese military presence in the South China Sea.

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