Zhang Gaoli attends the news conference after the closing session of the National People's Congress (NPC) at the Great Hall of the People on March 17, 2013 en Beijing, China.  (Feng Li / Getty Images)Zhang Gaoli attends the news conference after the closing session of the National People's Congress (NPC) at the Great Hall of the People on March 17, 2013 en Beijing, China.  (Feng Li / Getty Images)

Xi Jinping is the leader of the Chinese Communist Party, but he doesn’t have complete control over the regime. Más bien, former Party chief Jiang Zemin continues to influence matters of the day through his factional allies in key leadership positions, as well as through a vast political network.

Este año, the overseas Chinese press speculated that Xi is looking to dismantle the Politburo Standing Committee—the highest decision-making body in the regime, and a key political tool Jiang has used to impose his will or check ruling Party leaders.

The recent purge of top Tianjin official Yin Hailin and other members of the so-called “Tianjin gang” appears to be a move by Xi Jinping to implicate Standing Committee member and former Tianjin chief Zhang Gaoli.

Targeting Zhang would afford Xi an excuse to discredit the existing structure of collective leadership at the top, and break free from Jiang Zemin’s control.

Abolishing the Politburo Standing Committee?

Of the seven members in the Standing Committee, vice premier Zhang Gaoli, propaganda chief Liu Yunshan, and Chinese legislature head Zhang Dejiang are known allies of Jiang Zemin.

The two Zhangs and Liu have interfered with the rule of Xi Jinping.

Zhang Gaoli is linked with a massive chemical warehouse blast in Tianjin in 2015.

Zhang Dejiang, who also oversees the affairs of semi-autonomous Hong Kong and Macau, turned Hongkongers against Beijing by denying promised democratic reforms.

mientras tanto, Liu Yunshan is believed to be behind the efforts of state media and “nationalistic” bloggers’ casting Xi as a Mao-like figure.

Overseas Chinese media reported this year that Xi is dissatisfied with the Standing Committee system, and is considering dismantling it and adopting a presidential system. En efecto, Xi is already governing through several small but powerful policy panels, a sign that he is dissatisfied with the status quo.

Before Jiang Zemin stepped down as Party leader in 2002, he increased the number of Standing Committee members from seven to nine, and stacked the body with his allies. Each Standing Committee member ran his portfolio independently, resulting in a state of governance that one Chinese scholar described as feudal.

When Xi Jinping came to power during the 18th Party National Congress, the nine-member Standing Committee returned to a seven-member body.

The fall of Yin Haili

On August 22, the official website of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCCD) announced that Tianjin’s deputy mayor Yin Hailin was being investigated for “serious violations of discipline.”

From January 2000 until very recently, Yin, 56, served as the deputy director of the Tianjin Urban and Rural Planning and Design Institute. He was later appointed deputy director of the Tianjin Planning and Land Resources Bureau, and then promoted to director in December 2007. En Mayo 2012, Yin was made Tianjin deputy mayor, Tianjin Political and Legal Affairs Commission deputy secretary, as well as Tianjin Municipal Planning Bureau director.

Yin’s swift rise up the political ladder coincided with Politburo Standing Committee member Zhang Gaoli’s tenure as Tianjin Party Secretary from March 2007 to November 2012.

The Yin Haili-led Tianjin Municipal Planning Bureau appeared to be involved in the real estate corruption case of property developer Zhao Jin in 2014, as well as the massive explosions near the port of Tianjin on Aug. 2015. After the two high-profile incidents, there were rumors of shakeups at the Municipal Planning Bureau of Tianjin.

En efecto, after the announce of Yin’s arrest, a Tianjin official told semi-official press Beijing News that Yin’s demise has been speculated for quite a while, and he was linked with the Zhao Jin corruption case.

Zhao, the son of the Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee secretary-general, had leveraged on his father’s political post and connections to build a huge real estate empire. He was arrested by the authorities on June 2014, while Zhao Senior was taken away four months later. Después de esto, officials in Tianjin’s Municipal Planning Bureau were purged one after the other.

The Tianjin Gang

Compared to his serving in Tianjin’s planning authorities for over 30 años, Yin Hailin tenure in Tianjin municipality and law and security apparatus has attracted far less attention.

Several officials in Tianjin’s political and legal system have committed appalling abuses of power.

Por ejemplo, Li Baojin, former deputy secretary of Tianjin’s Political and Legal Affairs Commission and head of the municipality’s prosecuting body, was detained and interrogated on June 12, 2006. The following year, Li was handed a death sentence with reprieve for taking bribes and embezzling public funds.

En Junio 4, 2007, Song Pingshun, the chairman of Tianjin’s Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, committed suicide in his office. Song, 62, had controlled Tianjin’s political and legal system for many years, and was Li Baojin’s long-time superior.

Luego, Wu Changshun, then chief of the Tianjin Municipal Public Security Bureau, was placed under investigation. But the investigation into Wu was called off by Zhou Yongkang, then Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission deputy secretary, on the condition that Wu would oversee security for the Beijing Summer Olympics, according to respected Chinese financial publication Caixin.

Wu was eventually promoted to deputy head of the Tianjin Political and Legal Affairs Commission and vice chair of the Tianjin political consultative body. He held this positions until his arrest in July 2014.

Unlike Song, en, and Wu, Yin Hailin did not make his career in the public security system. But Yin eventually succeeded Wu Changshun nonetheless. Like Wu, Yin also had secret dealings with other powerful individuals.

Why the Tianjin Gang is Now in Trouble

The purge of deputies in Tianjin’s security and law apparatus can be traced back to the Chinese regime’s persecution of the spiritual discipline Falun Gong 17 hace años que.

En abril 25, 1999 10,000 Falun Gong practitioners gathered in Beijing and stood quietly outside Zhongnanhai to petition the authorities to release several practitioners who had been detained by Tianjin police.

The issue was resolved in a matter of hours after Falun Gong representatives spoke with Zhu Rongji, then Chinese premier. sin embargo, then Chinese leader Jiang Zemin seized the April 25 petition as a pretext to launch a large-scale suppression of Falun Gong.

At the time of the April 25 incidente, Song Pingshun was Party Secretary of Tianjin’s Political and Legal Affairs Commission, and head of Tianjin’s Public Security Bureau. Wu Changshun was deputy director of the Public Security Bureau, and Li Baojin was head of Tianjin’s prosecuting body.

Song, Wu, en, as well as former Central Political and Legal Affairs Party Secretaries Luo Gan and Zhou Yongkang, all have a hand in executing Jiang’s persecution campaign.

De paso, a distinct pattern has emerged in Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign: Many officials that have been investigated for corruption are also known to have persecuted Falun Gong.

The Yin Hailin-Zhang Gaoli connection

During Yin Hailin’s term as boss of Tianjin city planning officials, three of Tianjin’s districts— Tanggu, Hangu, and Dagang—were consolidated into a new area called Binhai. Yin is allegedly involved in the planning and construction of this Binhai New Area.

According to reports in overseas Chinese media, former Tianjin boss Zhang Gaoli made the development and opening up of the Binhai New Area one of his priorities.

Binhai New Area has numerous unfinished projects. Un total de 60 mil millones de yuanes (about US$9 billion) was invested in Xiangluowan Business District, one of the 6 functional districts in Binhai New Area’s central business district. But Chinese media describe Xiangluowan today as a “ghost town.”

The development company Binhai New Area Construction Investment Group incurred a huge amount of debt. Liu Huiwen, former chairman of Tianjin TEDA Investment Holding Co. Limitado, committed suicide in April 2014.

En 2014, the Party’s internal disciplinary agency sent inspection teams to Tianjin. En julio 9, the inspection teams told the Tianjin Municipal government that state owned enterprises in Tianjin were frequently involved in “major graft and bribery cases,” and there was “major corruption issues in the urban development and construction sector.”

According to some media reports, anti-corruption chief Wang Qishan ordered the Tianjin authorities to preserve the complete records of minutes taken at meetings of the province’s leadership since 2007. Wang also requested to view the original documents for government development projects, and insisted that “no one should tamper” with the paperwork.

Zhang Gaoli is said to be involved in private venture and equity fund cases worth hundreds of billions of yuan.

When Zhang took over Tianjin in 2007, he promoted all types of venture capital and private equity funds. But from early 2010 a 2012, the Tianjin authorities suddenly investigated and closed down these firms, affecting hundreds of thousands of families who invested in them.

Many of those affected journeyed to Tianjin to petition and lodge complaints. Some of the protesters were heard shouting “Zhang Gaoli, return our money!"

Tianjin explosions

en agosto. 12, 2015, a series of catastrophic explosions rocked Tianjin when a chemical warehouse in Binhai New Area blew up.

Binhai New Area is Zhang Gaoli’s biggest achievement in Tianjin. Ruihai International Logistics, the company that owned the warehouse where the explosions occurred, was allegedly controlled by the relatives of Zhang.

A day after the explosions, an overseas website claimed in an article that the Tianjin explosion was the work of terrorists. “Conspiracy theories” the article wrote, suggest that “the Tianjin explosions are surely the by-product of a power struggle inside the Chinese Communist Party. A rogue side created the human tragedy, and this group’s purpose is to threaten, intimidate, and force a crisis that would lead to an impeachment of Xi Jinping”. This claim hasn’t been verified.

mientras tanto, an Aug. 23 report by Hong Kong tabloid Apple Daily, citing sources in Beijing, claimed that Xi Jinping held a meeting of the Politburo Standing Committee on the night of the Tianjin explosion.

Some analysts believe that Jiang Zemin used the Tianjin explosions to bargain with Xi Jinping. Xi had reportedly detained Jiang temporarily in response.

Para este día, the inside story of the Tianjin explosions hasn’t been completely revealed. The connection between Yin Hailin’s downfall and the rumors about Zhang Gaoli adds additional mystery to the explosion.

This February, the Chinese regime’s State Council approved the investigation of the explosions in Tianjin.

Translated By SQ Wu, Susan Wang, & Benjamin Ng. Editado por Sally Appert.

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Chinese leader Xi Jinping was named commander-in-chief of the Joint Command Headquarters (JCH) of the Central Military Commission (CMC) En abril 20.
Xi also visited the centre as commander-in-chief for the first time, which caused concern. Wearing a camouflage uniform, Xi listened to reports on the JCH as well as the sub-JCH in five theaters through videos.
He appeared together with other members of the CMC. Unlike other officials and soldiers, his armlet only had CMC wording on it.
La reforma militar
This was the first time Xi appeared as commander-in-chief of the JCH after the military reform late last year.
The JCH is an important authority set up after China’s military reform. It is the highest and key command centre of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), where all military orders and dispatches come from.
El año pasado, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) said that the military reform would “fix JCH authoritiesand “build up the strategic and operational command system.
The JCH is defined in two levels, with one at the level of the CMC and another at the theatre level. Some analysts have said that as the brain of the Chinese military’s joint operations, the JCH of the CMC has always been strictly confidential and low-key since it was set up.
Since the end of last year, when Xi started the military reform, the old Departments of General Staff, General Politics, General Logistics, and General Armament have been changed to 15 functional departments, incluso 7 departments, 3 committees, y 5 direct institutions. en adición, 7 military districts were changed to 5 theatres.
Changes to the senior military personnel have been basically completed.
Similar to the old “Chief General”, the current commander-in-chief of the JCH is the person who issues military orders.
Under the current military system, the chairman of the CMC is a military and administrative top commander who holds the power of four military systems in command, construcción, administración, and supervision.
According to the old system, military orders were primarily dealt by the General Staff Department. The chief of the department then submitted them to the vice-chairmen and then the chairman of the CMC.
The chairman of the CMC is the concurrent commander of the current round of military reform.
Jiang controlled military
Supporters of former leader Jiang Zemin, Xi’s political rival, have controlled the military for a long time. Jiang himself was chairman of the CMC from 1989 a 2004.
Jiang promoted Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou to be vice-chairmen of the CMC to hold military power before he retired in 2004, while Jiang himself remained the chairman illegally for two more years. Jiang maintained his grip on military power for over 20 years altogether, cultivating many cronies and supporters in the army.
When Jiang toppled Yang Shangkun, former vice-chairman of the CMC in 1989, and his brother Yang Baibing, former director of the General Political Department in 1992, Jiang’s faction began to control the army.
Xu Caihou, nicknamed “Northeast Tiger,” and Guo Boxiong, nicknamed “Northwest Wolf,” both controlled an area in the military for more than 10 años, with confidants and partisans at all levels throughout the army.
According to an inside source, Guo once said, “If we were replaced, there would still be our men at next level.
According to a Mainland media report on April 12 este año, many of the current military officials were promoted by Guo during his 10-year post as vice-chairman of the CMC. Guo’s son, Guo Zhenggang, dijo, “More than half of the army cadres were promoted by my family.
Xu died of bladder cancer during prosecution March 15 last year. According to last June’s Ming Pao Monthly report, Xu made two statements in his last moments: that Guo’s problems were much more serious than his, and that only four people among the chief generals of large military districts did not bribe him.
Positions for sale
Previously, overseas media have disclosed that Guo and Xu traded rankings in the military. Guo and Xu firmly held the power over military personnel and monopolized almost all promotions of high-ranking military officials.
Yang Chunchang, vice-director of the former Military Construction Department of the Military Academy, disclosed on Hong Kong’s Phoenix TV on March 9 last year that Xu had price tags on military rankings. The military-district levels started at 10 millones de yuanes (US$1.5 million).
“In the army, including the armed police and the PLA, joining the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) also required money,” Yang told Phoenix TV. “There were always price tags for rankings from platoon, company, and regiment to division.
Yang added that for a commander of a big military district, if one person gave him 10 million yuan and another gave him 20 millones de yuanes, the one who gave more money would get the position.
“The military belonged to their family. They also oversaw the then-leader of the CMC. These were all very complicated issues,” Yang told Phoenix TV.
According to the CCP’s promotion system for military personnel, a senior general’s promotion must be granted by two CMC vice-chairmen.
Más:
China’s Communist System on the Verge of Collapse
Cleaning out Jiang’s forces
Xi began his anti-corruption campaign and military reform after he took office. Most of those investigated in the campaign have been members of Jiang’s faction.
Hasta aquí, 57 officials at the corps level and above have been sacked, including Jiang’s two henchmen, Xu and Guo, and their henchmen.
Through restructuring and a substantial personnel adjustment during the military reform, Xi has gained full control of the army.
Commentators have said that Guo, Xu, and their cronies have been gradually thrown out or marginalised. sin embargo, their partisans in the military are still difficult to clear out comprehensively.
Xi has won the power to give military orders. This warned the forces of Guo and Xu in the army, laying a foundation for cleaning out Jiang’s remnants in the military and arresting Jiang in the next step.
en febrero 1, the inaugural meeting of the five newly formed military theatres was held in Beijing. Xi granted each theater a bull flag and gave a speech.
Ji Da, a China expert based in Washington DC, said that the CCP military is commercialised. The army used its own businesses to raise

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Poco antes del 17 aniversario durante este año 10,000 practicantes de Falun Gong’ apelación pacífica en Zhongnanhai, líder de China, Xi Jinping, dio discursos inusuales respecto de las peticiones, religión, y las cuestiones políticas y legales.
Esto fue interpretado como Xi dar consejos para indicar su actitud. También aborda cuestiones que los ex líderes chinos Hu Jintao y Wen Jiabao no tenían ningún valor para tocar.
En abril 25, 1999, encima 10,000 practicantes de la disciplina espiritual Falun Gong fueron a la Oficina de Apelaciones del Consejo Estatal cerca de Zhongnanhai en Beijing para pedir a las autoridades a liberar 45 Los practicantes de Falun Gong que fueron injustificadamente detenido por las autoridades en la ciudad de Tianjin.
El incidente es considerado el más grande y la petición más tranquila y racional en la historia de China.
Zhu Rongji, quien era el ministro Premier en el momento, personalmente se reunió con representantes de los practicantes espirituales y se comprometió a liberar a los practicantes detenidos y darles el legítimo derecho a la práctica. El problema se resolvió en ese punto.
sin embargo, Jiang Zemin, el líder comunista en el momento, la etiqueta del incidente “sitiando Zhongnanhai.” Se inició una supresión masiva y cruel contra los practicantes de Falun Gong a partir de julio 20, el mismo año sin el consentimiento de los seis miembros restantes del Comité Permanente del Politburó.
La dura represión ha durado 17 años. Cada año, abril 25 se considera una fecha sensible. sin embargo, justo antes del aniversario de este año, Xi realizó una serie de movimientos inusuales y de alto perfil.
El mensaje importante soltó ha desencadenado una amplia atención del mundo exterior.
cuestión petición
En abril 21, los medios estatales publicaron XI y del ministro Li Keqiang asertividad en el tema de la peticionaria. Xi habló de “dedicar grandes esfuerzos para hacer frente a los problemas de peticiones pendientes, y resolver adecuadamente los problemas de demandas legítimas y legales de las personas.”
Li pidió “tratando de resolver los conflictos y proteger los derechos e intereses legítimos de las personas.”
El momento de las observaciones anteriores atrajo una gran atención.
Por el pasado 17 años, practicantes de Falun Gong han sido objeto de difamación, sentencia ilegal, tortura, y otras formas de persecución. Estas tácticas de tortura han comenzado gradualmente a aplicarse a muchos chinos comunes.
Ahora, como el movimiento de los derechos civiles de China sigue aumentando, más y más personas están empezando a luchar por sus derechos a través de peticiones.
shi Cangshan, un experto con sede en Washington sobre asuntos de China, Xi cree que optó por apoyar los derechos peticionarias de la gente y dio la instrucción para manejar adecuadamente la cuestión petición derecha antes de abril 25.
“Xi Jinping utiliza un“tú-debe-sabe” estilo para mostrar su postura sobre el asunto de Falun Gong, expresando su descontento con la persecución de Jiang Zemin,” Shi dijo.
Reunión sobre la religión
Del 22 de abril–23, Xi presidió una reunión de alto nivel sobre cuestiones religiosas. Cinco miembros del Politburó—Li Keqiang, Wang Qishan, Zhang Dejiang, Liu Yunshan, y Yu Zhengsheng—asistieron a la reunión.
Esta fue la primera vez que el líder más alto había presidido la reunión religiosa en 15 años. Anteriormente fue presidida por el Secretario de Asuntos Religiosos.
Xi hizo un discurso de alto perfil en los asuntos religiosos en la reunión. “Organizar y unir a la mayoría de los seguidores religiosos,” él dijo.
Los medios estatales hicieron una cobertura de alto perfil rápido de las noticias, que es significativamente diferente de cuando Jiang presidió la reunión.
En 2001, Jiang organizó el engaño autoinmolación de Tiananmen, en el cual Imágenes de televisión mostraron varios individuos que aparentemente se prendieron fuego. Los medios estatales ampliamente difundidas las imágenes, alegando que las auto-inmolados eran practicantes de Falun Gong.
Esta parte fue de campaña de difamación a gran escala de Jiang contra Falun Gong a través del sistema de propaganda del régimen comunista. Al final del mismo año, Jiang presidió la reunión nacional de la religión, pero aumentó la fuerza de la represión contra Falun Gong.
Los detalles de la reunión se informó de unos años más tarde.
Los funcionarios detuvieron
Al mismo tiempo, varios funcionarios del sistema de Políticas y Asuntos Legales fueron castigados por las autoridades de Xi antes de la edición de abril 25 aniversario.
En abril 24, Las autoridades anunciaron la noticia de que cuatro funcionarios del sistema de Asuntos Políticos y Legales habían sido disciplinados. El sistema político y Asuntos Jurídicos ha sido el partido más viciosa durante la persecución de Falun Gong por Jiang.
Desde Xi tomó el poder, ha habido una cierta limpieza a fondo en el sistema de autoridad política y judicial. Varios funcionarios clave han sido despedidos, entre ellos el ex secretario de la Central de Política y de la Comisión de Asuntos Jurídicos, Zhou Yongkang.
En abril 16, Zhang Yue, secretario de la Comisión de Asuntos Políticos y Legales de la provincia de Hebei, fue despedido de la posición para una mayor investigación. Zhang es uno de los seguidores de confianza de Zhou.
Zhou tomó el papel de Ministro de Seguridad Pública y el Director Adjunto de la Central de Política y de la Comisión de Asuntos Jurídicos en 2002. Zhang fue nombrado como jefe del Ministerio de “Oficina de Seguridad Pública 26” en 2003. Este es el famoso “Oficina 610,” una organización ilegal establecida por Jiang y sus seguidores con el único propósito de suprimir Falun Gong.
Zhang se convirtió en cómplice directo de la facción de Jiang en el sistema de seguridad pública. Después de ser trasladado al Comité de Hebei políticas y jurídicas 2007, Zhang se convirtió en la persona directamente responsable de la brutal persecución a Falun Gong en la provincia de Hebei.
Él estaba en la lista de investigación de la Organización Mundial para Investigar la Persecución a Falun Gong (WOIPFG).
En abril 25, medios de comunicación estatales informaron sobre cinco requisitos que hay que seguir de Xi para el sistema de autoridad política y judicial.
El asunto de Falun Gong
Antes del 17 aniversario del mes de abril 25, mas que 200,000 personas han presentado quejas en contra de Jiang por su persecución a Falun Gong. Algunos analistas creen que a medida que la comunidad internacional se vuelve cada vez más preocupados acerca de la persecución ilegal de Falun Gong, Xi tiene que enfrentar el problema de Falun Gong.
xi, Hu, y Wen no todos quieren ser los cabezas de turco de la persecución, pero Xi está manejando el tema de manera diferente.
El libro “La verdadera Jiang Zemin” reveló que cuando Jiang inició la persecución de julio 20, 1999, los otros seis miembros del Comité Permanente del Politburó no lo soportan. Eran Li Peng, Zhu Rongji, Li Ruihuan, Hu Jintao, Wei Jianxing, y Li Lanqing.
En abril 26, 1999, el día después de la apelación, el Comité Permanente del Politburó se reunió para discutir el asunto de Falun Gong.
Zhu Rongji dijo, “Que lo hagan los ejercicios.” Jiang se quedó

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